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Introduction
In 2007, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) saw its thirtieth
anniversary.' Although its first twenty-five years were relatively quiet, the
f Bank One Corporation Assistant Professor of Business Administration and
Assistant Professor of Business Law and Business Ethics at the Stephen M. Ross School
of Business, University of Michigan.
TT Assistant Professor of Law, University of British Columbia.
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494,
amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
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Cornell International Law Journal
same cannot be said for its last five years. In the current post-Enron,
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) era, 2 the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have increased dramatically
civil and criminal enforcement of the FCPA.3 Not only are these agencies
bringing an increasing number of cases, but the DOJ is also starting to
utilize novel theories of liability to prevent corrupt corporations from
avoiding prosecution.4 Record fines and intrusive settlement agreements
have accompanied the rise in enforcement actions.5 For example, in 2007,
Baker Hughes Inc., a supplier of oil field equipment, signed agreements
with the DOJ and the SEC in which the company admitted to paying over
$4 million in bribes to officials of a state-owned oil company in Kazakh-
stan.6 As part of the agreements, Baker Hughes was required to pay over
$44 million in fines and penalties-the largest monetary sum to date with
respect to FCPA violations-and retain an independent monitor to oversee
its implementation of a compliance program. 7 The DOJ and the SEC
reached similar settlements incorporating independent monitor require-
ments with other companies, including: Monsanto for payment of bribes to
an Indonesian official to ease environmental regulatory requirements on its
Stat. 1415, amended by the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(b), 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (1998)) [hereinafter FCPA].
2. For a review of the corporate scandals of 2001, including Enron, WorldCom, and
the legislative response of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L.
REV. 915 (2003).
3. See DANFORTH NEWCOMB, FCPA DIGEST OF CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELATING
TO BRIBES TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977 (AS
OF OCTOBER 5, 2007) 2 (2007) (stating that "[b]oth the DOJ and the SEC have become
increasingly aggressive in pursuing potential FCPA violations."); Justin F. Marceau, A
Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action: Evaluating and Forecasting the Trend of More
Frequent and Severe Prosecutions Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 285 (2007) (noting that "the Department of Justice has initiated
four times more prosecutions over the last five years than over the previous five years").
4. See Marceau, supra note 3, at 296-309 (describing ways that the DOJ has
expanded the reach of the FCPA through theories of liability applicable to parent compa-
nies, franchisors, successor companies, and others); see also John P. Giraudo, Charitable
Contributions and the FCPA: Schering-Plough and the Increasing Scope of SEC Enforcement,
61 Bus. LAW. 135, 135-36 (2005) (discussing Schering Plough's 2004 settlement with
the SEC, which followed the first FCPA violation to stem from charitable donations and
which demonstrates the SEC's willingness to bring actions against parent companies for
actions committed by a subsidiary without the parent's knowledge).
5. NEWCOMB, supra note 3, at 3.
6. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Baker Hughes Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to
Bribing Kazakh Official and Agrees to Pay $11 Million Criminal Fine as Part of Largest
Combined Sanction Ever Imposed in FCPA Case (Apr. 26, 2007), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07-crm-296.html [hereinafter Baker Hughes DOJ
Press Release]. In addition, the SEC complaint alleged that Baker Hughes violated provi-
sions of the FCPA with its actions in Nigeria, Angola, Indonesia, Russia, Uzbekistan, and
Kazakhstan. SEC v. Baker Hughes Inc., Litigation Release No. 20,094, ' 6 (Apr. 26,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20094.htm [herein-
after SEC v. Baker Hughes Inc. Litigation Release].
7. Baker Hughes DOJ Press Release, supra note 6.
Vol. 41
2008 Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings
genetically modified agricultural products; 8 Schnitzer Steel Industries for
its wholly owned subsidiary's payment of bribes in China and Korea to
induce purchases of scrap steel;9 and Micrus Corporation for payment of
bribes to doctors in Germany, Spain, France, and Turkey to sell medical
devices. 1°
These enforcement developments are not without controversy. Some
commentators question the harsh punishments imposed on corporations
that have self-disclosed FCPA violations and have taken remedial actions.1
Schnitzer Steel Industries, for example, discovered possible corrupt pay-
ments by its subsidiaries and then engaged in what the DOJ referred to as
"exceptional cooperation" by disclosing the payments and then taking
actions to improve its compliance program.1 2 Despite these efforts, com-
mentators complain that Schnitzer Steel received no real benefit from coop-
eration because the company still was required to pay large fines and had
to enter a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with an independent
monitor requirement.
13
In FCPA actions, as well as other criminal and regulatory matters,
14
the growing use of DPAs is creating the most controversy.' 5 In general,
8. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Monsanto Company Charged with Bribing
Indonesian Government Official: Prosecution Deferred for Three Years (Jan. 6, 2005),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/January/05_crm 008.htm.
9. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Schnitzer Steel Industries Inc.'s Subsidiary
Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribes and Agrees to Pay a $7.5 Million Criminal Fine (Oct. 16,
2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pr/pressreleases/2006/10/2006_
4809_10-16-06schnitzerfraud.pdf [hereinafter Schnitzer Steel DOJ Press Release].
10. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Micrus Corporation Enters into Agreement to
Resolve Potential Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Liability (Mar. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/March/05_crm_090.htm.
11. Michael Freedman, Trust Us., FORBES, Dec. 25, 2006, at 132, 133.
12. Schnitzer Steel DOJ Press Release, supra note 9.
13. Freedman, supra note 11, at 132-33; see Joan McPhee, Deferred Prosecution
Agreements: Ray of Hope or Guilty Plea by Another Name?, THE CHAMPION, Sept./Oct.
2006, at 12, 13-14 (arguing that DPAs are not always much of an improvement over a
guilty plea, as the company may still be required to admit wrongdoing, the size of the
fine may be the same, and the company often has to agree to highly intrusive govern-
ment terms regarding compliance programs and corporate monitors).
14. Because both the DOJ and SEC enforce FCPA violations, our discussion of DPAs
also includes settlements with the SEC, which often contain similar terms with respect
to the implementation of compliance programs and the use of corporate monitors. For
an overview of SEC actions in this area, see Jennifer O'Hare, The Use of the Corporate
Monitor in SEC Enforcement Actions, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 89 (2006).
Although there are differences between the civil and criminal contexts, they are consid-
ered together for the purposes of this paper.
15. Under a deferred prosecution agreement, the prosecutor files an indictment
against the corporation but agrees to defer prosecuting the charges if the corporation
agrees to certain undertakings, such as admission of wrongdoing and rehabilitation
through the implementation of a compliance program. Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note,
What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred?Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecu-
tion Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1864 (2005). If, at the end of the term of the
agreement, the prosecutor determines that the company has not breached the agree-
ment, the prosecutor will dismiss the indictment. Id. Non-prosecution agreements
(NPAs) are very similar, but the main difference is that an indictment is not actually
filed. Id. at 1872 n.60. For overviews of the use of DPAs and NPAs and their develop-
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there are concerns that prosecutors abuse their powerful bargaining posi-
tion to extract overly intrusive-and in some cases arguably arbitrary-
terms.16 In addition, commentators bemoan the costs of implementing a
compliance program that meets government demands and the required use
of corporate monitors without clearly defined powers as to who can take
actions adverse to shareholder interests. 17 Others, however, claim that
DPAs are too lenient on corporations and result in "crime without
conviction."18
This article takes a closer look at the use of DPAs, particularly the use
of corporate monitors in combating corruption. To understand the useful-
ness of this approach and suggest reforms to the process, the article situ-
ates the use of DPAs within the emerging category of regulation referred to
as "new governance"'19 regulation. A key feature of this form of regulation
is that the government agency sets policy goals but then relies on the regu-
lated entity to develop implementation techniques. 20 The foundation of
this approach is based on the recognition that effective regulation often
requires the utilization of local knowledge to determine what works in a
particular context.
2 1
The new governance approach is necessary for combating corpora-
tions' corrupt payments by corporations because the root cause of the
wrongful conduct is the individual corporation's culture. One of the main
problems in the FCPA context is the fit between the challenges presented
and the solutions available to prosecutors and enforcers. 22 Prosecutors
and enforcers acting on their own have neither the resources nor the man-
date to engage in the kind of large-scale, ongoing interventions into corpo-
ment over time, see generally Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal
Law, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45 (2006). For an in-depth case study of Bristol-
Myers Squibb's DPA from the prosecutor's perspective, see Christopher J. Christie &
Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the Road of Good Corporate Citizenship: The Deferred
Prosecution Agreement Between the U.S. Attorney for the District of NewJersey and Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co., 43 Am. CrmM. L. REV. 1043 (2006).
16. McPhee, supra note 13, at 14 (providing examples of DPA terms "requiring Bris-
tol-Myers Squibb to endow a chair in business ethics at the law school from which the
federal prosecutor received his law degree" or requiring MCI WorldCom to "use good
faith and reasonable commercial efforts to add 1,600 employees to its workforce in
Oklahoma").
17. O'Hare, supra note 14, at 102-06; see also Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L.
Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713,
1735-37 (2007).
18. Crime Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and Non Prosecution Agreements,
CORP. CRIME REP. (Nat'l Press Club, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 28, 2005, available at http://
www.corporatecrimereporter.com/deferredreport.htm [hereinafter Crime Without Con-
viction]; see also Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 Va. L. Rev. 853,
856 (2007).
19. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the
World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 471
(2004).
20. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse,
103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2107-08 (2005).
21. Id.
22. For an overview of the various methods of reform available to prosecutors to
combat corporate organizational crime, see Garrett, supra note 18, at 861-86.
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rations' corporate governance, culture, policies, and procedures that would
be required to fully address deep-seated corporate cultural pathologies.
2 3
Yet the prosecutor's most available and common recourse, deterrence
through monetary fines, has considerable limitations as a tool for effecting
corporate cultural change. 24 Even if prosecuting the hard FCPA cases were
easier and more frequent, deterrence in the form of monetary fines can
only be a partial response. 25 Monetary penalties do not address intracta-
ble problems of institutional culture except in the most accidental way.
2 6
Although monetary penalties may deter companies from engaging in open
and obviously illegal conduct, such penalties are unpredictable as tools for
effecting large-scale reform of organizational culture. 2 7 Encouraging firms
to appear law-abiding through, for example, the use of cosmetic compliance
programs or calculated cooperation with the government is not the same as
encouraging firms to actually be law-abiding, 28 particularly in the face of
collective action problems and the perceived business necessity of engaging
in bribery in certain countries.
2 9
Fostering responsible self-regulation is another important response to
the challenge of curbing corrupt practices. Broader societal pressures and
the so-called license to operate may be even more important than regula-
tory action in encouraging corporate compliance with law.30 The majority
of corporations tend to be law-abiding, not only because the law requires it
but also because they believe that the underlying legal requirements are
legitimate and that compliance carries rewards within their broader com-
munities. 3 1 However, voluntary self-regulation is insufficient on its own.
Many corporate managers in some countries believe that they need to pay
bribes to remain competitive or even to conduct business at all. 32 In addi-
tion, shareholders may put little pressure on corporations to end corrup-
tion, especially because the negative externalities associated with
corruption are not primarily borne within the United States.
3 3
23. See Crime Without Conviction, supra note 18, at 5.
24. Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 757, 766-74 (2005).
25. See id. (discussing such issues in the context of general securities laws enforce-
ment); see also infra Part I.D.
26. See Ford, supra note 24, at 769-74.
27. See id.
28. See infra notes 177-88 and accompanying text.
29. David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach;
The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 593, 608-09 (2000)
[hereinafter Hess & Dunfee, Fighting Corruption].
30. See Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why
Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 307, 329-39 (2004) (develop-
ing the idea of a "license to operate," which consists of social, economic, and legal
demands on the firm).
31. See id. at 336-37.
32. See Hess & Dunfee, Fighting Corruption, supra note 29, at 608-09.
33. However, investors taking a longer-term view should realize that both grand and
petty corruption "reduce profits and skew competition." David Hess & Thomas W.
Dunfee, Taking Responsibility for Bribery: The Multinational Corporation's Role in Combat-
ing Corruption, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DILEMMAS AND SOLUTIONS 260, 268 (Rory
Sullivan ed., 2003) [hereinafter Hess & Dunfee, Taking Responsibility]. In addition, pub-
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This article develops a new governance approach to combating corpo-
rate corruption that straddles the divide between self-regulation and tradi-
tional, command-and-control regulation. This approach involves the use of
reform undertakings in settlement agreements with the SEC or DPAs with
the DOJ. The reform undertaking is a novel remedial form that has
emerged in securities law enforcement over the last few years. 34 A primary
feature of this approach is the corporation's agreement to retain an inde-
pendent monitor that has direct obligations to the government agency. 35
The article argues that when implemented in a transparent and par-
ticipatory manner by a suitably qualified third party and augmented by
centralized learning, the reform undertaking is the best available mecha-
nism for grappling with difficult problems of organizational culture.
Reform undertakings, as well as the use of DPAs in general, are a growing
and controversial practice, but they have not yet received significant scru-
tiny by legal scholars. Although the particular focus of this article is on
combating corruption, the insights gained from this article's use of a new
governance perspective are applicable to the use of DPAs generally and to
the DOJ's and SEC's use of corporate monitors in other settings.
This article proceeds in the following way. Part I reviews the extent
and nature of corruption that continues to exist in international business.
Part I also explains how corrupt practices can be rooted in a corporation's
culture and thus persist despite external regulatory efforts to end bribery.
Part II provides an overview of new governance regulation and then
assesses the use of compliance programs under the organizational sentenc-
ing guidelines as a form of new governance regulation, finding some signif-
icant shortfalls. Next, Part III further develops the idea of a reform
undertaking and identifies the necessary requirements for this approach to
be an effective tool in combating corporate corruption.
I. The Continuing Problem of Corruption
A. The Paradox of Corruption
"[C]orruption is universally disapproved yet universally prevalent."
36
This paradox of corruption is as true today as it has ever been.
Although international efforts to combat corruption continue to evolve and
draw strong public support, corporations' payment of bribes continues as a
common business practice. For example, a KPMG survey conducted in
2005 and 2006 found that 11% of employees working in regulatory affairs
functions for their organizations observed others "[miaking improper pay-
lic awareness of a firm's payment of bribes may have a negative impact on a corpora-
tion's reputation. Id. at 268-69. Public interest may also have an impact on a firm's
broader, socially constructed license to operate. See generally Gunningham et al., supra
note 30.
34. See Ford, supra note 24, at 797-802.
35. See id. at 798.
36. Hess & Dunfee, Fighting Corruption, supra note 29, at 595.
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ments or bribes to foreign officials."' 37 A survey by Control Risks Group
Limited found that 32% of U.S. executive respondents believed that their
competitors from the United States "regularly" or "nearly always" 3 8 used
local agents as a way to attempt to circumvent anti-bribery laws.
39
There is even evidence to suggest that the prevalence of bribery is actu-
ally increasing in the post-SOX era of increasing attention to matters of
corporate integrity and accountability. The Control Risks Group survey
found that more U.S.-based corporations believed that they failed to win a
contract due to a competitor paying a bribe in 2006 than they did four
years earlier. 40 Overall, in 2006, 44% of the managers of U.S.-based corpo-
rations surveyed believed that they lost a contract due to bribery in the last
five years and 20% believed that the same had occurred in the last twelve
months.4 1 These managers were not optimistic that these trends would
reverse any time soon, as 82% of respondents believed that corruption
would increase or at least stay the same over the next five years.
4 2
B. The Limits of Deterring Corruption Through Enforcement
The United States became the global leader in the fight against corrup-
tion in international business with the passage of the FCPA in 1977.
43
Nevertheless, U.S.-based corporations continue to pay bribes at the same
rate as corporations from other developed countries. Based on Trans-
parency International's 44 2006 Bribe Payers Index, which ranks countries
based on their corporations' propensity to pay bribes when conducting
business abroad,45 the United States tied for ninth among the thirty lead-
37. KPMG FORENSIC, INTEGRITY SURVEY 2005-2006, at 5 (2006), available at http://
www.kpmginsiders.com/pdf/050362 ForlntegritySurvNEW.pdf. The survey "asked
employees whether they had 'personally seen' or had 'firsthand knowledge of miscon-
duct within their organizations over the prior 12-month period." Id. at 2. The survey
results were based on 4,056 respondents from eleven different industries. Id. at 23.
38. CONTROL RISKS GROUP LTD. & SIMMONS & SIMMONS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ATTI-
TUDES TO CORRUPTION SURVEY 2006, at 13 (2006), available at www.crg.com/PDF/
corruption survey_2006 V3.pdf.
39. Id. at 12-13. An additional 44% indicated that they believed their competitors
did so "occasionally." Id. at 13.
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 21 (finding that 28% of managers believed that corruption would increase,
54% believed it would stay the same, 12% predicted a decrease, and the remaining 6%
were undecided).
43. The FCPA provisions can be divided into two categories. First, corporations are
prohibited from bribing foreign officials. Marika Mars & Erika Singer, Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 575, 578, 582-90 (2006). Second, corporations must
meet certain accounting practices requirements with respect to adequate internal con-
trols and accurate record keeping. Id. at 579-81.
44. Transparency International is one of the most well-known civil society organiza-
tions devoted to combating corruption in all of its forms. Its website is located at http://
www.transparency.org.
45. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, BRIBE PAYERS INDEX (BPI): ANALYSIS REPORT 3 (2006). The
rankings are based on an anonymous survey of 11,232 executives from 125 countries.
Id. After these executives selected the nation of origin of the companies doing the most
business in their country, they were asked to answer the following question by ranking
the countries on a scale from "bribes are common" to "bribes never occur": "In your
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ing exporting countries. 46 Although a cluster analysis of the data that
divided the countries into four groups placed the United States in the
group least likely to pay bribes,47 Transparency International makes a
point not to congratulate these countries because "companies from all
countries in the survey show a considerable propensity to pay bribes. '48
There are several factors contributing to the failure of the FCPA to sig-
nificantly restrict the payment of bribes by U.S. companies. First, although
the DOJ and SEC have increased enforcement of the FCPA in the past few
years, 49 it still may be insufficient to create much of a deterrent effect. A
recent review of all cases prosecuted under the FCPA concluded that the
Act is significantly under-enforced and that a large share of the convictions
consisted of "easy"50 cases that resulted from actions such as self-reporting
of violations.51 In addition, many convictions relied on actions that the
corporation could have easily disguised to avoid detection, suggesting that
more careful firms are able to make similar payments without significant
fear of prosecution. 52 Overall, due to the DOJ's inability to demonstrate
that it can obtain convictions on cases of corruption involving complex
flows of money-the "hard"53 cases-corporations can continue to pay
bribes with little fear of prosecution.
54
Even though the FCPA may not provide much of a deterrent effect, it
serves an expressive function that tells managers that corrupt payments are
immoral. In the face of strong economic pressures to either pay a bribe or
lose business, however, moral suasion is not sufficient and many firms give
in and pay the bribe out of a belief that it is a business necessity.5 5 Other
major exporting countries do not enforce their anti-corruption laws, which
experience, to what extent do firms from the countries you have selected make undocu-
mented extra payments or bribes?" Id.
46. Id. at 3-4.
47. Id. at 5. The members of this group (in order from least likely to pay bribes to
most likely) were: Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, Austria, Canada, the United Kingdom,
Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, the United States, and Japan. Id.
48. Id. In fact, the press release accompanying the publication of the 2006 Bribe
Payers Index contains the subheading "Foreign bribery by emerging export powers 'dis-
concertingly high."' Press Release, Transparency Int'l, Bribe Payers Index 2006 (Oct. 4,
2006), available at http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/surveys-indices/bpi/
bpi_2006#pr.
49. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (noting the recent increase in FCPA
enforcement actions and the record fines imposed).
50. Philip Segal, Coming Clean on Dirty Dealing: Time for a Fact-Based Evaluation of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 18 FLA. J. INT'L. L. 169, 187 (2006).
51. Id. at 170-71.
52. Id. at 171, 175, 189-94 (reviewing eleven convictions under the FCPA and show-
ing how the corporation in each case could have easily avoided or significantly reduced
the likelihood of detection).
53. Id. at 195.
54. See id. at 195-96.
55. See RONALD E. BERENBEIM, CONFERENCE BOARD RESEARCH REPORT: RESISTING COR-
RUPTION: How COMPANY PROGRAMS ARE CHANGING 9 (2006) (noting that of the twenty
executives participating in a webcast conference poll, 84% believed that the FCPA failed
to deter bribery in many cases due to a belief that there is a need to pay bribes in some
countries).
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exacerbates this problem.5 6 If other countries are not enforcing their anti-
corruption laws against their home corporations, then U.S. corporations
will continue to feel that paying bribes is a business necessity in some
situations. In other words, all major exporting countries must enforce
their anti-bribery laws to ensure that all multinational corporations com-
pete on a level playing field and feel less pressure to pay bribes.
A recent review of enforcement of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development's Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions by Transparency Inter-
national presents some signs that international enforcement is improving,
but a closer look reveals that there are many reasons to believe that prose-
cution is not a significant deterrent. As for positive signs, fourteen of
thirty-four signatory countries show signs of enforcement as demonstrated
by significant cases of prosecution or investigations. 5 7 However, eighteen
countries have not prosecuted any companies or individuals for corrup-
tion,5 8 and in both 2006 and 2007, the United States brought more prose-
cutions than the other thirty-three countries combined.5 9 Furthermore,
despite the increases in enforcement and international efforts to publicize
new laws on corruption, many managers remain ignorant of their exis-
tence. 60 One survey found that 42% of executives of U.S. companies with
international operations were "totally ignorant"6 1 of the laws covering brib-
ery.62 Executives of corporations from such major exporting nations as
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom were even more likely to claim
total ignorance of these laws.
63
C. Solving the Problem of Corruption
Solving the problem of corruption requires that it be attacked with a
variety of approaches that simultaneously address different causes of the
problem. 64 These approaches must seek to both reduce the demand for
bribes (which comes from public officials receiving the bribes) and restrict
56. See supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text (providing data on international
enforcement trends).
57. FRITZ HEIMANN & GILLIAN DELL, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, PROGRESS REPORT 07:
ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFI-
CIALS 6 (2007).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 5 (calculated from the data on prosecutions). To get a sense of the involve-
ment of a country's corporations in international business, it is useful to note that the
United States accounted for 9.99% of world exports in 2006, compared to 56.87% for
the other thirty-three countries. Id.
60. CONTROL RISKS GROUP LTD. & SIMMONS & SIMMONS, supra note 38, at 10.
61. Id.
62. Id. This study was based on telephone interviews conducted in July 2006 of 350
high-level executives (the respondents were described as "senior decision-makers at or
near board level"), fifty each from Brazil, France, Germany, Hong Kong, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. at 22.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Thomas W. Dunfee & David Hess, Getting from Salbu to the 'Tipping Point': The
Role of Corporate Action Within a Portfolio of Anti-Corruption Strategies, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& BUS. 471, 472-73 (2001).
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the supply (which comes from corporations paying the bribes).6 5 This
article focuses only on the supply side. It is important to remember, how-
ever, that the anti-corruption efforts of multinational corporations can
assist in de-institutionalizing established norms of corruption in a host
country and thereby reduce the demand for bribes.
66
There are many mechanisms available to reduce the supply of bribes.
Increasing enforcement of existing criminal laws both within the United
States and internationally can help provide a deterrent, as well as help level
the playing field, which reduces the pressure to pay a bribe to win busi-
ness.6 7 As discussed previously, enforcement has been limited and is not a
complete solution to the problem. 68 Some commentators argue that
encouraging corporations that lose contracts to a bribe-paying corporation
to sue the corrupt corporation for civil damages can bolster the deterrent
effect of criminal enforcement. 6 9 In the past, there was an experiment with
an international panel to hear complaints of competitors paying bribes, but
this approach ultimately proved unsuccessful.
70
Finding ways to encourage effective self-regulation is also a necessity.
A voluntary corporate principles approach seeks, in part, to encourage
multinational corporations to band together in their promises and efforts
not to pay bribes. 7 1 Such initiatives are part of a larger and more general
focus on corporate social responsibility. For example, the United Nations'
Global Compact is a set of ten principles on core values that all corpora-
tions should support, including working against corruption in any form.72
65. See generally id. (discussing how a portfolio of different approaches would be
more effective in combating corruption by addressing different aspects in combination).
66. See Chuck C. Y. Kwok & Solomon Tadesse, The MNC as an Agent of Change for
Host-Country Institutions: FDI and Corruption, 37 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 767 (2006) (provid-
ing an empirical analysis supporting the idea that multinational corporations have a
positive influence).
67. HEIMANN & DELL, supra note 57, at 15.
68. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
69. Ethan S. Burger & Mary S. Holland, Why the Private Sector Is Likely to Lead the
Next Stage in the Global Fight Against Corruption, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 45, 63-68
(2006) (reviewing cases filed in U.S. courts by corporations seeking damages from cor-
porations alleged to have paid bribes to win contracts); id. at 72-73 (arguing in favor of
a strong plaintiffs' bar for bringing civil lawsuits on the basis of corrupt payments).
70. Stuart Marc Weiser, Dealing with Corruption: Effectiveness of Existing Regimes on
Doing Business, 91 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 99, 99-101 (1997) (presenting the com-
ments of Francois Vincke). The International Chamber of Commerce established the
panel, but the panel failed to have any impact on business behavior. Id. at 100-01.
71. See Hess & Dunfee, Fighting Corruption, supra note 29 (outlining a corporate
principles approach to combating corruption); Hess & Dunfee, Taking Responsibility,
supra note 33, at 263-64 (reviewing corporate principles approaches supported by the
Caux Round Table, Social Accountability International, and Transparency
International).
72. United Nations Global Compact, The Ten Principles (last visited May 20, 2008),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html. The
Tenth principle states that "[b]usinesses should work against corruption in all its forms,
including extortion and bribery." Id. For a critique of the Global Compact and how it
fits into discussions of corporate social responsibility, see Justine Nolan, The United
Nations' Compact with Business: Hindering or Helping the Protection of Human Rights?, 24
U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 445 (2005) (discussing three fundamental flaws of the Global Corn-
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The FTSE4Good, a leading equity index of socially responsible firms, 73
has recently established anti-bribery criteria that firms must meet in order
to stay in the index.
74
As a necessary addition to these various approaches, this article devel-
ops the idea of self-regulation through the lens of new governance regula-
tion. For this purpose, it is important to recognize that corruption is not
unlike other problems of wrongdoing committed by organizations, such as
fraud, discrimination, or violations of environmental regulations. In all
cases, wrongdoing is not simply a matter of corporations being "rational
profit maximizers"'75 that make compliance decisions based on a cost-bene-
fit calculation that weighs the benefits of noncompliance against the sever-
ity of potential penalties, discounted by the probability of being caught.
76
Instead, wrongdoing can become embedded in organizational polices, prac-
tices, and perceptions. Thus, any regulatory approach that seeks to combat
corruption must find ways to improve the ethical culture of corporations
engaged in bribery. Reform undertakings are a necessary tool in this
endeavor. Therefore, the goal of reform undertakings is to encourage cor-
porations to improve their cultures and to develop a better understanding
of how those improvements are accomplished in order to develop best prac-
tices to be used throughout the industry. The next section shows why the
issue of corporate culture must be addressed when attempting to combat
corruption.
D. Why FCPA Enforcement Must Focus on Issues of Corporate Culture
Combating the supply side of corruption will not be successful with-
out taking steps to ensure that corporations are developing cultures that
are supportive of the effort to end corrupt payments. To illustrate, consider
again this article's opening case of Baker Hughes Inc. This company, head-
quartered in Houston, Texas, provides oil field services throughout the
world. 77 In 2001, the SEC issued a cease-and-desist order claiming that the
company made improper payments to an Indonesian official and that the
company made payments in Brazil and India without assuring itself that
pact, namely "lack of clarity in the content and scope of the Compact's principles; its
limited notions of accountability and transparency; and the overemphasis on the value
of the voluntary approach to improving corporate behavior"); see also Oliver F. Williams,
The UN Global Compact: The Challenge and the Promise, 14 Bus. ETHICS Q. 755 (2004)
(reviewing the lack of adequate accountability structures related to U.S. companies'
reluctance to join the compact while expressing optimism that the forum that the com-
pact provides is the best means to achieve consensus).
73. See Oliver Balch, Raising the Bar of Performance, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at 7.
74. See Firms Must Meet Bribery Criteria for FTSE4Good, SUPPLY MGMT., Mar. 16,
2006. The criteria went into effect on July 1, 2006 for firms in industries that are at
high risk for paying bribes and on January 1, 2007 for firms considered at "medium"
risk. Id. Details on the criteria can be found at FTSE, COUNTERING BRIBERY CRITERIA
(2006).
75. Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451,
453 (2003).
76. Id. at 453-55.
77. In re Baker Hughes Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 44,784 § III(A) (Sept. 12,
2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-44784.htm.
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the payments would not ultimately be used for bribes. 78 In addition, the
SEC alleged that the company did not properly record the payments and
instead listed them as ordinary business expenses. 79 As part of the cease-
and-desist order, Baker Hughes was required to develop internal account-
ing controls to prevent improper payments in the future.80 In 2007, how-
ever, the SEC filed a complaint against Baker Hughes alleging that for
several years after the date of the cease-and-desist order the company con-
tinued to make payments in countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Indonesia,
Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan without adequately assuring itself
that these payments were not going to government officials.81 As part of
its deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ, Baker Hughes admitted
to paying bribes in Kazakhstan until at least November 2003.82
Can a few rouge employees be blamed for these numerous acts involv-
ing the payment of bribes and employees actively attempting to avoid direct
knowledge of whether a payment will be used by an agent to pay a bribe?
Will installing a better internal control system end these practices? Can
the improper payments be explained simply by blaming leadership for not
doing a better job of monitoring and supervising subordinates? 83 Business
ethics researchers and other social scientists studying organizations know
that the answer to all these questions is "no."'84 Corrupt practices can
become so ingrained in a corporation's daily activities that simply adding
more controls or increasing monitoring activity has only limited effective-
ness because such actions do not address the root of the problem: the cor-
poration's culture. 85
Encouragingly, the importance of addressing the problem of corporate
culture is gaining greater recognition in the law. As discussed further in
Part 11.B, the 2004 amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
updated the list of characteristics required of an effective compliance pro-
gram for organizations to receive a mitigated sentence.8 6 In addition to
updating the structural characteristics requirements of the original 1991
78. Id. at § IV(A).
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. See SEC v. Baker Hughes Inc. Litigation Release, supra note 6.
82. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., Attach-
ment A, 10-13 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2007) (copy on file with authors) [hereinafter
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Baker Hughes].
83. See Susanne C. Monahan & Beth A. Quinn, Beyond 'Bad Apples' and 'Weak Lead-
ers': Toward a Neo-Institutional Explanation of Organizational Deviance, 10 THEORETICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 361, 361-62 (2006) (stating that commentators often attempt to explain
deviant behavior within organizations by blaming individual "bad apples," explicit
orders from leadership for subordinates to commit wrongful acts, or the failure of leader-
ship to monitor and supervise employees).
84. See id. at 362 (stating that explanations that focus only on individual failures
downplay the importance of the organizational environment); see also Linda Klebe Tre-
viflo et al., Behavior Ethics in Organizations: A Review, 32 J. MGMT. 951, 966-68 (2006)
(reviewing empirical studies on the influence of organizational culture on individuals'
ethical behavior).
85. See Trevifto et al., supra note 84, at 966.
86. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(2) (2004).
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Guidelines (e.g., anonymous reporting mechanisms and training pro-
grams), the amendments state that corporations also must "promote an
organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment
to compliance with the law."'8 7 Likewise, the DOJ views the decision to
indict a corporation as a potential tool to improve corporate cultures8 8 and
considers a corporation's existing culture when making the decision of
whether or not to indict a corporation. 89
The following subsections take a closer look at how corporate culture
can influence whether employees make improper payments. This discus-
sion provides a foundation for understanding the role of the law in improv-
ing corporate culture.
1. Combating Corrupt Corporate Cultures: Understanding Individual
Rationalizations
To understand how the law can help corporations develop cultures
that do not condone or unintentionally promote the use of corrupt pay-
ments, it is useful to first look at the individuals within the corporation and
then take a step back to see how the organization influences individual
behavior.90 For individuals within corporations, the concern is that other-
wise ethical employees pay bribes-or ignore obvious warning signs that
the corporation's agents are paying bribes-by rationalizing their behav-
ior.9 ' There are several different ways that employees rationalize corrupt
behavior. First, employees may take actions that they know are wrong by
denying any responsibility for those actions.9 2 They do this by claiming
that they have no alternative but to pay a bribe.93 Employees rationalize
87. See id.
88. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Dep't
Components and U.S. Attorney 2 (Dec. 12, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty] (stating that "[i]ndicting corporations for wrongdo-
ing enables the government to address and be a force for positive change of corporate
culture").
89. Id. at 6 (stating that a corporation's "history of similar conduct may be probative
of a corporate culture that encouraged, or at least condoned, such conduct, regardless of
any compliance programs").
90. Vikas Anand et al., Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of Corrup-
tion in Organizations, 19 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 9, 9-10 (2005).
91. See id. at 10-14. Rationalizations allow individuals "to neutralize their negative
feelings or regrets about their behavior." Id. at 10. Although the authors use the word
"corruption" in their article, they use the word to refer to general wrongdoing and not
simply the payment of bribes. Id. Of course, it is important to recognize that both
payment of bribes and avoidance of due diligence, which is intended to avoid direct
knowledge that payments to an agent are being used for bribes, are not unlike other
types of corporate wrongdoings, including price-fixing, securities fraud, and violations
of environmental regulations.
92. See id. at 11-12.
93. See id. At Baker Hughes, managers responded to bribe requests by stating that
the payments were "'distasteful"' but nevertheless "necessary." Complaint at 11-13,
SEC v. Baker Hughes Inc. (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/complaints/2007/comp20094.pdf. One subcontractor grudgingly consented
to making the payment and stated in an e-mail, "Our response to the question is do we
have any option?" Id. at 11.
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this behavior by claiming that they are trapped in a problem that is not of
their creation (and is perhaps a long-standing "tradition" in a country) and
thus do not have to take moral responsibility for doing what they know is
wrong.
94
Employees also may deny that anyone is injured by their conduct.9 5
Given the belief that no one is harmed and that the members of the organi-
zation are benefiting through the new business, employees do not feel bad
about paying a bribe.96 However, bribery causes real harms with long-
term impact on a country's economic development, the performance of a
government's vital functions, and citizens' realization of essential human
rights. 97 With their perceptions filtered by short-term economic demands,
employees may find it difficult to see how their actions make these
problems worse in any appreciable way or how their refusal to pay a bribe
will make a difference for the better (especially considering that if they do
not pay the bribe, a competitor likely will).
Moreover, euphemistic labeling9 8 makes it easier for employees to
avoid seeing the harm. Employees pay "facilitating payments," which the
FCPA specifically allows, rather than bribes.99 This further muddies the
moral problem of corruption. In other situations, a corporation may view
its use of a local agent that is making improper payments as a failure to
"adequately assure" 10 0 itself of the agent's intentions and actions rather
than directly condoning bribery, which hides the moral nature of the prob-
lem and treats it as an assurance problem. 10 1 In addition, many view an
omission to act that causes harm as less ethically wrong than an affirma-
94. See Anand et al., supra note 90, at 12.
95. See id. at 12-13.
96. See id. at 13.
97. Hess & Dunfee, Fighting Corruption, supra note 29, at 596-97; Hess & Dunfee,
Taking Responsibility, supra note 33, at 261-62; Vito Tanzi, Corruption Around the World:
Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures, 45 IMF STAFF PAPERS 559, 582-86 (1998).
98. See Arthur P. Brief et al., Collective Corruption in the Corporate World: Toward a
Process Model, in GROUPS AT WORK: THEORY AND RESEARCH 471, 485 (Marlene E. Turner
ed., 2001); see also Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of
Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 Soc. JUST. RES. 223, 226-28 (2004) (discussing
language euphemisms and unethical behavior in organizations).
99. The FCPA states that the prohibitions on bribery "shall not apply to any facilitat-
ing or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or party official the pur-
pose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental
action by a foreign official, political party, or party official." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b)
(2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (2000) (providing the same exception for
"domestic concerns"). "Routine government actions" include such matters as obtaining
mail delivery service and necessary permits, licenses, and visas. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)(i)-(v) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A)(i)-(v) (2000).
100. See SEC v. Baker Hughes Inc. Litigation Release, supra note 6 (listing instances in
which Baker Hughes failed to adequately assure itself that an agent was not making
improper payments).
101. See Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 98, at 227 (noting problems that result
from the use of certain terms in business situations, such as "transactions costs" and
"profit maximization," which "are ... devoid of the human and potential ethical dimen-
sions of decisions").
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tive action that causes harm. 10 2 Thus, employees may consider it morally
unproblematic to ignore red flags and fail to conduct due diligence on an
agent, even though they would have problems with affirmatively authoriz-
ing the payment of a bribe. 10 3 This is compounded by the fact that
employees will likely feel greater loyalties to their team within an organiza-
tion than to society generally 10 4 and, therefore, will be willing to pay
bribes that provide a short-term benefit to the team at the expense of per-
petuating a cycle of corruption.
10 5
Some employees actually may feel that they are doing the right thing
for society by paying a bribe. Consider the ethical dilemma set out by
Berenbeim:
Suppose, for example, you were a project manager bidding on a local govern-
mental contract to build a bridge. You know that a bribe is necessary for
your proposal to even receive serious consideration. Other companies that
you believe do inferior work will not hesitate to pay the bribe. Should you
sacrifice the lives and safety of a country's innocent citizens because of your
company's unwillingness to accede to deeply ingrained cultural and political
practices? No act of yours will put an end to this practice; the only conse-
quence will be death and injury to those who use the bridge.106
Many employees will rationalize their behavior through such a line of
analysis. 107
Finally, because FCPA violations are apparently rarely enforced rela-
tive to the actual number of violations (or at least perceived violations), 10 8
individuals may begin to challenge the legitimacy of the law as it is applied
and, therefore, not see noncompliance as unethical.1 0 9 Arbitrary enforce-
102. David M. Messick & Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of
Decision Making, 37 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 9, 15 (1996).
103. See Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 98, at 226-28 (describing how language
euphemisms allow actors to take actions that they would otherwise view as morally
unacceptable).
104. See Anand et al., supra note 90, at 13.
105. See Tanzi, supra note 97, at 24.
106. Ron Berenbeim, Dir., Conference Board's Working Group on Global Bus. Ethics
Principles, Cutting Off the Supply Side of Bribes: Being Against Corruption is More
Difficult Than You Think: Address Before the OECD Washington Conference on Corrup-
tion (Feb. 23, 1999), in 65 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 408, 409 (1999) [hereinafter
Berenbeim, Cutting Off the Supply Side of Bribes].
107. Berenbeim challenges a manager that believes paying a bribe in that situation is
justified by asking: "How can the manager be certain that his company's bridge is suffi-
ciently superior to justify the bribe? If we allow the justification for bridge bidding,
what others must we also permit? Should those who believe themselves to be purveyors
of other higher quality, lower cost products be allowed similar flexibility?" Id. at 409.
Berenbeim hopes that those questions will cause managers to doubt their practices, but
the questions also demonstrate how easy it is for managers to fall prey to this rationali-
zation. That is, any managers who rightly or wrongly believe that they have a higher-
quality product than their competitors could use this justification.
108. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (discussing enforcement trends).
109. See Anand et al., supra note 90, at 13. The same would apply to a company's
provisions on the payment of bribes in its code of conduct. Prohibiting the payment of
bribes is not as simple as those unfamiliar to the area may believe. Two challenging
areas are facilitation payments and business courtesies, which include small gifts, travel
expenses, and entertainment expenses. Dunfee & Hess, supra note 64, at 476-80. The
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ment of the FCPA and other countries' anti-corruption laws (as perceived
by employees) raises issues of fairness. As established by Tom Tyler's work
in social psychology, individuals feel less of a moral obligation to follow a
law that is applied unfairly. 110
Overall, employees can easily find rationalizations to take actions that
are against a company's code of conduct or the law. The fault, however,
does not lie only with (or even primarily with) the individuals. Organiza-
tions with unethical cultures push employees to use these rationalizations
where they otherwise would not. The organization's socialization process,
social norms, and incentive systems can all work to encourage employees to
rationalize their actions and believe the corrupt practices are "business as
usual.""' Of course, organizational culture can also support the ethical
values that make employees more likely to refuse to pay or authorize bribes
and work to prevent those around them from engaging in corrupt acts.
1 12
The next section takes a closer look at how corporate cultures can
encourage wrongful conduct by employees.
2. Combating Corrupt Corporate Cultures: Understanding Organizations'
Social Architecture
To understand how corporate cultures function and evolve over time, it
is useful to distinguish between a corporation's "hardware" 113 and its
,software."' 14 A corporation's hardware includes its formal structure, poli-
cies, and processes. 115 "Software" refers to the informal norms of behavior
within an organization," 16 which includes the ethical culture and ethical
climate of the firm. 1 17 With respect to combating corruption, a corpora-
FCPA allows these payments, but at some point, they cross the line and become bribes.
Id. Attempting to distinguish when a manager or agent has crossed that line is
extremely difficult and depends on local laws and customs. Id. Thus, what one man-
ager's company considers an improper payment may be allowed by a competitor. Ten-
brunsel & Messick, supra note 98, at 228-29. Even within one company, similar
payments made in different contexts may be treated differently. Id. To some employees,
the distinctions may seem arbitrary and unfair. Id. In addition, the allowance of facilita-
tion payments and business courtesies can place managers on a slippery slope, where
they continually push the boundaries of what is an acceptable payment until they have
crossed the line without being fully aware of the ethical and legal issues involved. Id.
110. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
111. Anand et al., supra note 90, at 10-11.
112. Id. at 19.
113. David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the Organiza-




117. For purposes of this paper, we will use the term ethical culture to include the
firm's ethical climate. "Ethical climate" refers to employees' perceptions of organiza-
tional practices that have ethical content. Linda Klebe Trevifio et al., The Ethical Context
in Organizations: Influences on Employee Attitudes and Behaviors, 8 Bus. Eriucs Q. 447,
448-50 (1998) [hereinafter Treviflo et al., The Ethical Context]. "Culture," on the other
hand, refers to the informal and formal systems of behavioral controls within the organi-
zation. Id. at 451-52. Ethical climate and ethical culture are considered to be strongly
related. Id. at 474; see also Daniel R. Denison, What is the Difference Between Organiza-
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tion's hardware includes its code of conduct, FCPA compliance program,
and internal accounting controls.1 18 How those formal processes work in
practice, however, depends on a firm's software. 119 Thus, enforcement
actions that simply require corporations to adopt a compliance program
and adequate internal controls often will not be enough. 120 Although orga-
nizational hardware policies are necessary, they are not sufficient.
12 1
Social norms within the organization can easily render compliance pro-
gram requirements meaningless.
12 2
As one example, consider the use of employee hotlines. This is a tool
to allow employees to anonymously report unethical or illegal behavior
they have observed to upper management. These hotlines are considered a
vital part of an effective anti-bribery compliance program. 123 To function
as desired, however, hotlines must be supported by an organization's
software, which requires leadership to actively manage the process.
12 4
Employees will not use the hotlines if they believe that they will face retalia-
tion (a fear that exists even with anonymous reporting) or that the organi-
zation will not take action to correct the problem that they report. 1 25 To
create an organizational culture that supports reporting wrongdoing, man-
agement must actually show employees that there is no retaliation for any
reports filed and that all reports will be fully investigated and dealt with
appropriately. 1 26 DuPont, for example, does this by distributing "Business
Ethics Bulletins" to its employees that describe wrongdoing within the
organization, how the wrongdoer was punished, and how the transgression
came to the attention of management. 12 7 Without these extra efforts,
upper management should not have confidence that this piece of organiza-
tional hardware will have any impact on reducing the payment of bribes.
if management does not attend to the software of the organization,
then other aspects of the organization's hardware can end up having unin-
tended, negative consequences that contribute to the routinization of cor-
tional Culture and Organizational Climate? A Native's Point of View on a Decade of Para-
digm Wars, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 619, 645 (1996) (arguing that scholars studying
organizational climate and organizational culture are not making clear distinctions
between the two, and that climate versus culture is more a matter of "differences in
interpretation rather than differences in the phenomenon").
118. Hess, supra note 113, at 1807-11.
119. Id. at 1811.
120. Anand et al., supra note 90, at 19; Hess, supra note 113, at 1811.
121. Hess, supra note 113, at 1807-11.
122. Id. at 1811.
123. BERENBEIM, supra note 55, at 23.
124. Id.; Hess, supra note 113, at 1811.
125. A recent survey by the Ethics Resource Center supports this proposition. Of
respondents witnessing misconduct of any form, almost half did not report the miscon-
duct. ETHICS RESOURCE CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: How EMPLOYEES VIEW
ETHICS IN THEIR ORGANIZATIONS 1994-2005, at 29 (2005). When asked what factors
influenced their decision not to report the acts, 59% stated that they did not believe that
the company would take corrective action, 46% stated a fear of retaliation, and 39%
doubted that their report would really remain anonymous. Id.
126. Hess, supra note 113, at 1795-97.
127. Andrew Singer, DuPont's Daring Communications Formula, ETHIKOS & CORP.
CONDUCT Q., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 1, 1-2.
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ruption within the corporation. Over a period of time, wrongdoing,
including the payment of bribes and the failure of employees to heed warn-
ing signs that an agent of the corporation is paying bribes, can become
institutionalized into the culture of the organization.1 28 This occurs
through a process in which the leadership of the organization condones or
encourages the wrongful behavior (either explicitly or implicitly), employ-
ees choose to engage in the behavior, and then, over a period of time, the
wrongful actions become routine. 129 The starting point of this process can
be the intentional as well as unintentional acts of leadership throughout the
organization.
A useful starting point in seeing how this process works is the imple-
mentation of the organization's incentive system, which is a key part of the
organization's hardware. An organization's promotion and compensation
systems can have significant influences on employees' attitudes on corrup-
tion.130 Rewarding employees for only the end result (e.g., winning a con-
tract) without considering the means (e.g., whether or not they paid a
bribe), punishes employees for losing a contract where they refuse to a pay
a bribe or use a questionable agent. 13 1 When employees see that their
rewards are based on only the ends, they receive an implicit message that
the organization encourages employees to use unethical means to reach
those ends.13 2 This message gets communicated to employees even if the
organization has clear policies on bribery, because it is the actual imple-
mentation of the incentive system that communicates what the organiza-
tion "really values." 13 3 Moreover, poorly drafted anti-bribery policies also
can send the message that a firm's true priority is winning contracts.
134
For example, one study found that less than half of firms involved in inter-
national business have a written policy stating that the company acknowl-
128. See Brief et al., supra note 98, at 473.
129. Id.
130. Anand et al., supra note 90, at 14 (referring to the process of co-optation).
131. Hess, supra note 113, at 1796.
132. Brief et al., supra note 98, at 474. A recent KPMG survey asked respondents
what causes employees to engage in misconduct. KPMG FORENSIC, supra note 37, at 6.
The most common response-selected by 57% of respondents-was that employees "feel
pressure to do 'whatever it takes' to meet business targets." Id. In addition, 49% of
respondents pinned blame on a belief that they would be rewarded only for their results
and not for the means used, and 46% identified a fear of losing their jobs if they did not
meet their targets. Id. Others have referred to this problem more generally as resulting
from a "finance mode of control." See Monahan & Quinn, supra note 83, at 364-65.
Under this mode, upper management pushes down the hierarchy the problems of man-
aging "conflicts between imperatives for profit and for adherence to external regulations
and norms" by setting "financial goals for subunits and set[ting] their workers loose to
pursue those goals .... " Id.
133. John M. Darley, The Dynamics of Authority Influence in Organizations and the
Unintended Action Consequences, in SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZA-
TIONS 37, 40 (John M. Darley et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Darley, The Dynamics].
Darley summarizes this point by stating that "talk is meaningful to the extent that it
connects with the incentives eventually provided through the incentive system." Id.
134. See John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in
CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 13, 25 (David M. Mes-
sick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996) [hereinafter Darley, How Organizations Socialize].
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edges that refusing to pay a bribe may result in lost business.13 5 Such an
incentive system in practice works to further an employee's rationalization
that he or she has no responsibility for his or her wrongful actions, because
there is no alternative but to pay the bribe. 136 In addition to the reward
system, the authority structure inherent in organizations gives legitimacy to
these implicit or explicit orders to engage in questionable acts.
13 7
Over time, actions that once raised doubt in employees' minds and
forced them to rationalize their behavior become routine. 13 8 Employees no
longer question, for example, failing to conduct appropriate due diligence
on agents so that they can avoid direct knowledge of the agents' acts or
listing questionable payments as ordinary business expenses. Acts that
may appear so clearly wrong to an outsider become the banal, day-to-day
functions of a member of the organization (or a sub-group within the
organization). 13 9 As new members enter the organization, they are slowly
socialized into the standard practices of the organization and the system
perpetuates itself.140 In addition, the system can strengthen over time, as
those who dislike the implicit practices leave the organization and those
who participate stay and are promoted.'
4 1
Reinforcing this process is the expectation within the organization
that employees must obey upper management without question. In some
situations, management explicitly orders employees to commit questiona-
ble acts, 142 but in other situations, employees wrongfully assume that they
were ordered to commit the acts.14 3 Employees make incorrect assump-
tions because they seek to stand out by taking the initiative and therefore
act upon orders before they are given. They determine these orders by intu-
iting what management would want based on the objectives that they were
told to accomplish and without asking a lot of questions. 144 In either the
135. BERENBEIM, supra note 55, at 18-19.
136. See Anand et al., supra note 90, at 11-12.
137. See Brief et al., supra note 98, at 477-79; Darley, The Dynamics, supra note 133,
at 38-39.
138. See Brief et al., supra note 98, at 482-83.
139. Id. at 484.
140. Anand et al., supra note 90, at 14-16; Brief et al., supra note 98, at 488-90.
141. Anand et al., supra note 90, at 14; Darley, The Dynamics, supra note 133, at
37-38.
142. At KPMG, senior partners allegedly attempted to use pressure to engage in
potentially illegal acts related to tax shelters without questioning the appropriateness of
the acts by sending out e-mails stating in red font, "You will do this now," or responding
to questions that were asked by stating, "You're either on the team or off the team."
Hess, supra note 113, at 1800-01 n.126.
143. See Brief et al., supra note 98, at 478 (applying the "rule of anticipated reactions"
in determining that "implementation of authority requires no a priori command").
144. Darley, How Organizations Socialize, supra note 134, at 24-25. Darley also pro-
vides an example of an organizational cover-up of wrongdoing that is instructive here.
Id. at 26-27. Once managers discover that their acts (or failure to act) have unintention-
ally caused an organization to commit a harmful act, social dynamics in the organiza-
tion and psychological processes push those managers to deny that harm occurred or
that the harm was caused by their actions. Id. Lower-level employees, who are more
directly aware of the harm and its cause, then interpret management's denial as a tacit
order to lie about the harm and its organizational causes. Id. at 27. This dynamic is
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case of explicit orders or assumed orders, the result is the same: employees
are more likely to engage in unethical conduct, they do not deliver bad
news to their superiors that could change those superiors' orders, and they
do not report wrongdoing committed by others that they observe. 145 Over-
all, in a culture where employees are expected to have unquestioned obedi-
ence to their supervisors, employees rationalize their acts by believing that
they are not morally responsible for their actions because they have no
alternative but to follow their supervisors' orders.
14 6
Other aspects of an organization's software that matter more for
improving ethical behavior than its hardware 147 include leadership's
demonstrated commitment to ethics, leadership's fair treatment of employ-
ees, and employees' confidence in being able to have an open discussion on
the ethical issues related to any decision that they must make. 148 When
these factors are not present, wrongful behavior is more likely. 1 4 9 All these
factors are involved in a complex process that top management likely does
not fully understand and probably has misperceived. 150 The development
of a corrupt corporate culture is an insidious process that evolves over
time. As Sung Hui Kim states, employees become "complicit in [wrongdo-
ing], not through any overt or explicit calculation, but through a subtle and
implicit reconfiguration of preferences, self-conception, and motiva-
tion."
15 '
more likely to occur in an organizational culture with a strong obedience to authority
norm. Similarly, for corrupt payments, the same process can occur when an organiza-
tion starts to see evidence that an agent who has been vital to winning new contracts in
a country may be making improper payments.
145. Linda Klebe Trevifio et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works
and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REv. 131, 136-37, 143-44 (1999) [hereinafter Trevifio
et al., Managing Ethics].
146. Anand et al., supra note 90, at 12.
147. See Trevifio et al., Managing Ethics, supra note 145, at 136-40 (finding that for-
mal characteristics of a compliance program were less important than informal aspects
of implementation and the firm's culture for such outcomes as observed unethical or
illegal behavior, awareness of ethical or legal issues, seeking advice on ethical issues,
delivering bad news to management, reporting observed violations, and improved deci-
sion-making).
148. Id. at 141-44; see also ETHics RESOURCE CTR., supra note 125, at 60, 89 (provid-
ing data showing the importance of demonstrated ethical commitment by top manage-
ment for reducing unethical behavior within organizations and fostering the conditions
that make unethical behavior less likely); Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Can Busi-
nesses Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct?: The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work
Settings, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1143, 1153-54 (2005) (providing empirical evidence on the
importance of the perceived legitimacy and morality of rules over command-and-control
type approaches for obtaining organizational rule-following behavior).
149. Trevifio et al., Managing Ethics, supra note 145, at 136 tbl.2.
150. See ETHIcs RESOURCE CTR., supra note 125, at 75 (discussing empirical evidence
showing that although top management may believe that they are projecting a commit-
ment to ethics, lower-level managers and employees often have different perceptions);
Linda Klebe Trevifio, Out of Touch: The CEO's Role in Corporate Misbehavior, 70 BROOK.
L. REv. 1195, 1208-09 (2005) (stating that upper-level management often has a signifi-
cantly more positive view of the organization's ethical culture than do lower-level
employees).
151. Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-situating the Inside Counsel as Gate-
keeper, 74 FORDHAm L. REv. 983, 997 (2005). Kim's article is a discussion of inside
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Of course, the key to preventing employees from rationalizing behavior
or being socialized into unethical practices is prevention; an organization
must establish an ethical culture before wrongdoing occurs and becomes
institutionalized as routine.15 2 Part II reviews the current legal attempts to
encourage corporations to develop ethical cultures and discusses how
these approaches fit into a new governance approach to regulation. This
sets the foundation for Part III's development of the necessary next steps
for the effective use of reform undertakings.
II. New Governance Regulation and Corporate Compliance Programs
A. Understanding New Governance Regulation
New governance is an alternative approach to regulating business that
has received recent attention from both regulators and legal scholars. 153
This approach to regulation is based on the basic belief that effective imple-
mentation of any law or regulation requires "empathetic understand-
ing" 15 4 of the specific situation of a regulated entity and allowing that
organization to have an active role in determining its strategies for compli-
ance. 15 5 Such an approach "will be most effective if the firm ... absorbs
[those compliance strategies] into its meaning structure so that they
become part of its mode of operation or existence.' 1 5 6 Thus, this approach
is both a move away from command-and-control regulation, where the gov-
ernment's only role is to set definite rules and then punish noncompliance,
and a move toward a more decentralized approach, where the government
sets basic goals and seeks direct involvement from corporations in develop-
ing individualized strategies to attain those goals.
15 7
Regulators are using this approach in such diverse areas as environ-
mental regulation, 158 food safety,' 5 9 occupational health and safety,
1 60
and employment discrimination. 1 6 1 In each case, the organization plays a
significant role in developing its own strategies for compliance with the
law. This reflects basic new governance principles of experimentation at
counsels' complicity in corporate fraud, but the social psychology literature that she
relies on directly applies to the corporate culture issues discussed here. Id.
152. Anand et al., supra note 90, at 17-18.
153. See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342 (2004) [hereinafter
Lobel, The Renew Deal].
154. Rubin, supra note 20, at 2107.
155. Id. at 2107-08.
156. Id. at 2108.
157. See id. at 2108-09.
158. Robert F. Durant et al., Introduction to ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE RECONSID-
ERED: CHALLENGES, CHOICES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 1, 1 (Robert F. Durant et al. eds., 2004).
159. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Pri-
vate Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & Soc'y REV. 691, 696-98 (2003).
160. See generally Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The
Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 1071 (2005).
161. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 475-76 (2001) [hereinafter Sturm, Second
Generation].
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the local level, 162 but with the lessons from those experiments spread
throughout the system through a process of dynamic learning that creates
continual improvement. 163 The role of the law is to orchestrate this pro-
cess by "facilitating innovation, standardizing good practices, and
researching and replicating success stories from local or private levels."'
1 64
A primary example of this approach for organizations involves efforts
to prevent employment discrimination. The challenge for the law in this
area is to end what Susan Sturm refers to as "second generation" discrimi-
nation. 16 5 Second generation discrimination is rooted in the structural
features of an organization and its culture, 16 6 as opposed to "first genera-
tion" discrimination, which is based on overt and intentional actions.'
67
Likewise, as discussed previously, problems of corrupt practices within
organizations are more complex than individuals making a rational deci-
sion to pay a bribe in full awareness of its wrongfulness and its potential
consequences for themselves and their organizations. The observations
that Strum makes about the problems and limits of a traditional rule-
enforcement model of reducing discrimination apply equally to combating
corruption. In general, Sturm argues that a rule-enforcement model
encourages lawyers and compliance officials to adopt strategies focused on
reducing "the short-term risk of legal exposure rather than strategies that
address the underlying problem."'1 68 In the area of corruption, this is evi-
denced by the fact that the global growth in anti-corruption laws is causing
more managers to state that legal risks are a more important factor in the
development and monitoring of their anti-bribery compliance programs
than are concerns related to ethics and the ethical culture of the
organization. 16
9
Unlike a rule enforcement model, a new governance model utilizes the
law as a tool to encourage corporations to use a problem-solving approach
toward combating corruption. Through "legal orchestration," 170 firms
162. Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 153, at 379-82 (2004) (discussing the impor-
tance of learning through a diversity of approaches and encouraging continual
improvement).
163. Id. at 395-400.
164. Id. at 401. For general overviews of the new governance approach, see id. at 348
(identifying the basic organizing principles of the new governance approach as
"increased participation of nonstate actors, stakeholder collaboration, diversity and
competition, decentralization and subsidiarity, integration of policy domains, flexibility
and noncoerciveness, adaptability and dynamic learning, and legal orchestration among
proliferated norm-generating entities"); Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform:
Wisconsin's New Governance Experiment, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 645, 677 (2006) (identifying
the core elements of the new governance approach as "experimentation, provisional
rules, benchmarking of best practices, and structures of accountability based on trans-
parency"). The seminal work on the theoretical development of this approach is Michael
C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 267 (1998).
165. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 161, at 468.
166. See id. at 468-69.
167. See id. at 465-67.
168. Id. at 476.
169. BERENBEIM, supra note 55, at 17.
170. Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 153, at 345.
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should be encouraged to engage with their employees and outside consul-
tants to identify the problems rooted in the organization's hardware and
software, and then develop (and continually improve) workable
solutions.
171
B. The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG) can be viewed as a
form of new governance regulation. 172 Under the OSG, if a firm adopts an
effective compliance program (i.e., one that meets seven basic hardware
requirements set out in the guidelines), then it will receive a reduced sen-
tence if it is later found guilty of a crime. 173 The idea behind the guide-
lines is for the government to establish the goals and basic parameters of a
compliance program, and then let the firm utilize its knowledge to best
implement such a program so that it is both effective and consistent with
the firm's structure and strategy.1 74 In recognition of the importance of
the firm's software in ensuring an effective program, the 2004 amendments
to the OSG refer to "compliance and ethics programs"' 7 5 and require that
firms "promote an organizational culture that encourages 'ethical' con-
duct."'176 Thus, although the government cannot compel any organization
to be "ethical," it can establish appropriate incentives for organizations to
define ethical conduct (which, under the OSG, simply means compliance
with the law) and to determine how to develop such an ethical culture for
their organization.
Although many firms may attempt to meaningfully implement a com-
pliance program, which empirical evidence suggests can be effective if
done appropriately, 177 many other firms may seek the benefits of a miti-
gated sentence by adopting only the appearance of a compliance pro-
gram. 178 More important, under the McNulty memorandum, a 2006
memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, the Deputy Attorney General, the ben-
efits are not just a reduced sentence but avoidance of prosecution com-
pletely.179  Because prosecutors cannot easily determine which
corporations have meaningfully implemented a compliance program and
which have not, creating only the appearance of a compliance program,
without the cost and effort of actually adopting one, is an attractive strat-
egy. 180 This is commonly referred to as "cosmetic compliance."'18 ' At the
171. Id. at 420-21; Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 161, at 475.
172. See Rubin, supra note 20, at 2108.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 2108-09.
175. Paul Fiorelli & Ann Marie Tracey, Why Comply? Organizational Guidelines Offer a
Safer Harbor in the Storm, 32 J. CORP. L. 467, 483 n.92 (2007) (noting that the revised
guidelines make forty-five references to "[clompliance and [e]thics [pirograms").
176. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(2) (2006).
177. See Hess, supra note 113, at 1791-95 (providing a review of the empirical stud-
ies on the effectiveness of compliance programs).
178. Id. at 1784.
179. See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, supra note 88.
180. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Com-
pliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1408 (1999) [hereinafter Laufer, Corporate Liability].
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extreme, cosmetic compliance creates a moral hazard problem: Where cor-
porations with largely symbolic compliance programs actually take less
care to prevent wrongdoing because they have protection against prosecu-
tion, they can ultimately end up committing more wrongful acts. 182
A related problem may be referred to as "calculated cooperation."'
183
By cooperating with prosecutors, corporations become less likely to be
prosecuted, and instead, the government will only file charges against indi-
viduals. 18 4 This policy is contained in both the McNulty memorandum
and the Thompson memorandum that proceeded it. 18 5 Credit for coopera-
tion 18 6 is not without controversy, however. Recently, there has been
debate about prosecutors requiring corporations to waive attorney-client
privilege to be considered as "cooperating."'18 7 For this article's purposes,
the main concern is that credit-for-cooperation leads corporations to scape-
goat certain employees to end the governmental inquiry without adequate
examination of the organizational causes of the wrongful act, such as the
corporate culture. 188
Due to problems of cosmetic compliance and calculated cooperation,
the OSG does not adequately address the issue of requiring problematic
firms to actually change their cultures. Instead, bribe-paying firms can eas-
ily decouple these efforts from the actual culture of the organization. In
addition, granting leniency to corporations for calculated cooperation does
not provide an incentive for firms to meaningfully conduct a full analysis of
their culture to determine why corrupt payments persist and then take the
necessary steps to right that culture. Thus, for corporations that have
demonstrated that corruption is rooted deep in their culture, some other
approach is needed.
C. Beyond Carrots and Sticks: The Challenge of Reversing Corrupt
Corporate Cultures
As stated earlier, corruption is not necessarily a problem of "rational
profit maximizers" making calculated cost-benefit decisions on whether or
not a firm should make improper payments. In many cases, the use of
improper payments becomes an unquestioned organizational norm that no
181. Id. at 1407; see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491-92 (2003).
182. Laufer, Corporate Liability, supra note 180, at 1415-18.
183. See Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethink-
ing Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 Am. CRiM. L. REv. 53, 93-97
(2007).
184. Id. at 82-83.
185. Id. at 82-86.
186. See Ford, supra note 24, at 792-96.
187. See id. at 794 n.123.
188. Laufer refers to this problem as reverse whistle blowing. William S. Laufer, Cor-
porate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 87 IowA L. REV. 643, 648-49,
657-62 (2002) [hereinafter Laufer, Corporate Prosecution]. Under reverse whistle blow-
ing, it is possible for upper management to implicate lower-level management in the
wrongdoing and thus end the government's investigation even though the corporation
had a culture of encouraging the wrongful behavior. See id. at 657-62.
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longer raises a moral question with employees.' 8 9 The initial cause of
these norms can be either intentional or unintentional acts of upper man-
agement. 190 Either way, once these practices become embedded in the
firm's culture, they are not easily reversed. 19 1 Thus, simply requiring
bribe-paying firms to improve their compliance programs and internal con-
trols will likely not be sufficient. The firms must find ways to reverse their
corrupt cultures and then maintain their improved cultures going forward.
Drawing on social psychology research, Arthur Brief and his col-
leagues suggest several ways to reverse a culture of wrongdoing and allow
employees to stand up for what is right rather than blindly following
implicit and explicit orders. 19 2 In short, an organization must find ways to
support "functional disobedience," which is an open challenge to the legiti-
macy of implicit or explicit orders to engage in unethical behaviors. 19 3 A
primary way to do this is through social norms of open communication.
194
Such norms allow employees to state their ethical concerns with organiza-
tional practices and find others with similar misgivings. 19 5 With the sup-
port of others, an employee is more likely to respond with responsible
behavior than simply to follow orders or comply with existing routines.
196
To promote functional disobedience, Professor Brief and his colleagues
state that
the goal of disobeying morally questionable orders must be emphasized by
management, methods and procedures for accomplishing this goal must be
visibly in place, employees must be rewarded for functional disobedience,
support (e.g., training) for accomplishing this goal must be readily available,
and employees generally must feel their personal welfare is protected by
management. 1
9 7
Brief and his colleagues emphasize that all of these factors must be present
and that the absence of any one can result in a continued culture of
wrongdoing. 198
Not surprisingly, the factors that can reverse an unethical culture are
the same factors that researchers identified as necessary to maintain an
ethical corporate culture. 1 99 The way to put these factors into operation is
not simply through the adoption of a compliance program consistent with
the OSG requirements but through the adoption of an integrity-based pro-
gram. 20 0 Integrity-based programs are compliance and ethics programs
189. See Brief et al., supra note 98, at 491-95.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 491-92.
193. Id. at 492.
194. Id. at 493.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 494.
198. Id. at 495.
199. See Trevifto et al., Managing Ethics, supra note 145, at 141-44.
200. Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compli-
ance with Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 71, 104 (2002).
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not based primarily on following the rules and punishment for violations
but rather on the emphasis of shared organizational values. 20 1 Existing
empirical evidence suggests that compliance programs with a stronger
integrity-based foundation are more effective in attaining a positive ethical
climate and reducing unethical behavior than programs based simply on
rule enforcement.20 2 External pressures to adopt a compliance program,
however, can work against the adoption of an integrity-based program
because such programs may look less rigorous and merely symbolic to out-
siders. 20 3 In addition, for an organization already heavily engaged in
wrongful conduct, an external change agent may be necessary to reverse
embedded wrongdoing and install an integrity-based program, as insiders
"may lack the ability, will, and credibility to effect the needed changes."20 4
Overall, two things are necessary to reverse the cultures of corrupt
corporations. First, firms must adopt a problem-solving approach to deter-
mine what about their cultures contributes to the continuation of corrupt
payments. This is not an easy task, as corporate cultures related to ethical
behavior involve complex interactions of multiple factors. Second, firms
must reverse those cultures and ensure that ethical cultures exist going for-
ward. This requires firms to find the right balance between a rules-based
approach to compliance programs and an integrity-based approach.
Because each corporation has a unique history and situation, this balance
will vary between firms. Reform undertakings are the best mechanism
available to prosecutors and enforcers to achieve these goals. Part III fur-
ther describes reform undertakings and their necessary requirements for
success.
III. Combating Corporate Corruption Through Reform Undertakings
A. Reform Undertakings and New Governance Regulation
1. Reform Undertakings: What, Why, When
Reform undertakings are agreements between the DOJ or SEC and cor-
porations 20 5 (or other regulated entities) 20 6 that settle investigations
201. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARv. Bus. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106, 110-11; see also Gary R. Weaver & Linda Klebe Treviflo, Com-
pliance and Values Oriented Ethics Programs: Influences on Employees' Attitudes and Behav-
ior, 9 Bus. ETHICS Q. 315, 315-16 (1999) (discussing different orientations of legal and
ethical compliance programs).
202. For a review of the empirical literature, see Hess, supra note 113, at 1791-93,
1802-3.
203. See Langevoort, supra note 200, at 105, 113.
204. Anand et al., supra note 90, at 20-21.
205. The examples are many, and they increase every month. Examples include Bris-
tol-Myers Squibb Company for channel stuffing, see generally Christie & Hanna, supra
note 15; Computer Associates for securities fraud, Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
United States v. Computer Associates Int'l (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2004) (copy on file with
authors); Aspen Technologies for securities fraud, In re Aspen Tech., Inc., Securities Act
Release No. 8827, Exchange Act Release No. 56,170 (July 31, 2007), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/33-8827.pdf; Delta & Pine Land Company for vio-
lations of the FCPA, In re Delta & Pine Land Co., Exchange Act Release No. 56,138 (July
26, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-56138.pdf; and
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related to violations of securities law, including FCPA violations. 20 7 As a
term of a settlement or agreement, a corporation agrees to improve its com-
pliance programs and to retain, at its own expense, an independent third-
party monitor, consultant, or auditor (the Third Party) to provide expert
assistance with, and possibly to oversee, the corporation's implementation
of that program. 20 8 The Third Party's role is to intervene in the firm over a
period ranging anywhere from six months to three years and to identify
compliance failures along with reasons for the alleged violation.20 9 The
Third Party then reports back to the regulator or prosecutor as to his or her
findings and recommendations for improvements to the compliance pro-
gram, as well as the steps taken by the corporation in response to those
recommendations.
2 1 0
Reform undertakings reflect a profound shift in prosecutorial and
enforcement philosophy. In comparison to conventional sanctions, such
as monetary penalties or criminal prosecution of individuals, the reform
undertaking is more open-ended, less deterministic, and significantly more
interventionist. 2 11 As such, it is most appropriate for the "worst actor"
cases. 2 12 That is, it is best suited for cases where corrupt practices are the
result of the insidious organizational culture issues discussed in Part ID
21 3
and where such practices have continued to persist or are believed will con-
tinue to persist, notwithstanding other sanctioning efforts. 21 4 The clearest
cases for the use of reform undertakings involve those corporations at the
top of what Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite call the "enforcement pyra-
Statoil for violations of the FCPA, In re Statoil, ASA, Exchange Act Release No. 54,599
(Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54599.pdf.
206. In re Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., Securities Act Release No. 8832, Exchange Act
Release No. 8,832, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,925 (Aug. 9, 2007), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/33-8832.pdf; In re Nat'l Stock Exch.,
Exchange Act Release No. 51,714 (May 19, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litiga-
tion/admin/34-51714.pdf; Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Attorney, S.Dist. N.Y., to
Robert S. Bennett, Attorney for KPMG LLP, KPMG - Deferred Prosecution Agreement
(Aug. 26, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/
kpmgdpagmt.pdf.
207. Ford, supra note 24, at 759-60. They also may be court-ordered or administra-
tively ordered. Id. at 797-98. Previously, the term "reform undertaking" referred only
to settlements with regulatory enforcement staffers, but for present purposes, it refers
also to similarly structured agreements reached with criminal prosecutors pursuant to
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. See id. Garrett focuses only on
DOJ deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, and uses the term "struc-
tural reform prosecution." Garrett, supra note 18, at 854-55.
208. Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 17, at 1721-26.
209. See id.
210. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Baker Hughes, supra note 82, at
15-17 (requiring the corporate monitor to provide three separate reports during the
term of the DPA, each providing the monitor's assessment of the company's progress in
establishing a compliance program and adequate internal controls, and making recom-
mendations for improvements in the company's policies and procedures).
211. See Ford, supra note 24, at 804-05.
212. See id.
213. See supra Part I.D.
214. See supra Part L.D (discussing Baker Hughes' compliance issues.)
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mid."'215 When dealing with these actors, regulators should not assume
that voluntary (post-enforcement) steps toward ensuring the use of an
effective compliance program are necessarily bona fide, rather than an
attempt to mitigate sanctions solely through external appearances. 216 Reg-
ulators also should not automatically assume that corporations are credi-
ble where they claim their problems are the result of an insular group of
"bad apples." 217 In both situations-cosmetic compliance and calculated
cooperation-the enforcement environment has created a skewing effect
and encouraged strategic action by corporations in trouble with criminal or
regulatory authorities. The cases for which reform undertakings are most
appropriate are precisely those in which voluntary self-regulation has
demonstrably failed.
Based on the available public records, Schnitzer Steel appears to be
one such worst actor case. According to the SEC's cease-and-desist order,
two wholly owned subsidiaries of Schnitzer Steel made improper payments
in China and South Korea on their own behalf and as an agent for other
customers from 1999 to 2004.218 Although most of the payments were in
small increments ranging from $3,000 to $15,000, the payments totaled
over $1.8 million over the course of those five years. 219 In an attempt to
hide the improper payments, the subsidiaries used schemes to disguise the
payments as "refunds" or recorded payments to government officials as
"sales commissions. ' 220 In some cases, the heads of the subsidiaries used
secret bank accounts to make the payments.
22 '
The involvement of two subsidiaries, the frequency of the payments,
and the attempts to disguise them over an extended period of time strongly
suggest that these practices had become embedded as a routine practice
within the corporate culture. Moreover, during this time, Schnitzer Steel
neither implemented a system of controls to monitor compliance with the
FCPA nor provided its employees or agents with even basic training on the
requirements of the FCPA.222 Even when company compliance officials
notified executives of suspected improper payments in 2004, the company
continued to pay bribes that were already promised and instructed employ-
ees to increase "entertainment expenses" to clients to make up for any
reduction in direct cash payments.223 Thus, although the company
engaged in "exceptional cooperation" with the government, 224 Schnitzer
215. IAN AYRES &JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DER-
EGULATION DEBATE 38-41 (1992).
216. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text (discussing cosmetic
compliance).
217. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text (discussing calculated
cooperation).
218. In re Schnitzer Steel Industries Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 54,606, at 2-3
(Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54606.pdf.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 3.
221. Id.
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Steel has demonstrated that it belongs in the worst actor category and
needs significant assistance in reversing its corrupt corporate culture.
Likewise, Baker Hughes, discussed in Part I.D, 22 5 also appears to be a
worst actor that suffers from an organizational culture where improper pay-
ments have become the norm and are not questioned. Despite the issuance
of an SEC cease-and-desist order related to improper payments in 2001
that required the company to implement appropriate controls, the com-
pany continued to engage in the payment of bribes, falsifying those pay-
ments in company records. 22 6 Furthermore, according to the SEC
complaint, the company exercised willful blindness 22 7 toward the use of
possibly corrupt agents. 228 Overall, the use of corrupt payments contin-
ued from at least 1998 to 2005 and occurred with agents or employees in
six different countries.2 29 In addition, multiple heads of Baker Hughes
operating divisions authorized over $4.1 million in improper payments
that Baker Hughes admitted to in its DPA.230 Although the legal depart-
ment was allegedly made aware that the company planned to hire a new
agent (whose commission was the improper payment), managers involved
did not carry out proper due diligence and the legal department did noth-
ing more than hand the necessary forms to the managers.
2 3 1
For these worst actor corporations, the reform undertaking has several
advantages relative to conventional regulatory mechanisms, such as stand-
alone monetary sanctions or sanctions targeting only individuals within
the organization. Most important, the reform undertaking responds to
concerns about cosmetic compliance, scapegoating, institutional capacity,
and limitations of deterrence in effecting thoroughgoing reform of corpo-
rate cultures. Specifically, this mechanism recognizes and accepts both the
strengths and weaknesses of the prosecutorial/enforcement model. That
is, it accepts that prosecutors do not have the resources or inclination to
engage in ongoing, deep reform efforts at individual corporations,
although they have significant flexibility in crafting case-specific reme-
dies. 23 2 In addition, to a certain degree, reform undertakings uncouple the
225. See supra notes 6-7 and 77-82 and accompanying text.
226. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Baker Hughes, supra note 82, at Attachment A,
11-13. The company recorded bribes as "commissions," "fees," or payments for "legal
services." Id. at 12.
227. See generally William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer
Responsibility for Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. REG. 1, 1, 25 (2005) (decrying institu-
tional arrangements that permit "willful blindness" or "deliberate ignorance").
228. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. For a listing of the alleged corrupt
payments made after the cease-and-desist order, see Complaint, supra note 93, at 31-33
(alleging that Baker Hughes made over 80 improper payments totaling over $9.5 million
after the 2001 cease-and-desist order, including payments the company did not ade-
quately ensure itself were not used as bribes).
230. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Baker Hughes, supra note 82, at Attachment A,
8-9, 12.
231. Complaint, supra note 93, at 13-14.
232. Perhaps counterintuitively, prosecutors and regulatory enforcement staffers may
in some ways be more receptive to new governance methods than mainstream regulators.
See MALCOLM SPARRow, THE REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING PROBLEMS,
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liability phase of prosecution or enforcement from the remedial phase. By
setting parameters for a post-settlement process mediated by a Third Party
rather than directly by a prosecutor, reform undertakings create a tempo-
ral, structural, and dialogical space for efforts to work through stubborn
cultural problems. 23 3 This reduces (though obviously cannot eliminate)
the pressure toward strategic action by the corporation. 23 4 At the same
time, reform undertakings can be even more "destabilizing"23 5 to a corrupt
corporation than regular prosecutions or enforcement actions but in a
more constructive manner; they put in motion a process with unpredict-
able effects, amplifying the impact of the process on the corporation.
236
Reform undertakings, through their explicit problem-solving methods,
have the capacity to distinguish between cosmetic compliance and genuine
compliance. Unlike one-shot deterrent sanctions where the broader effect
is hard to ascertain, reform undertakings present an opportunity for prose-
cutors and enforcers to discern the underlying causes of corporate wrong-
doing and then work toward determining how to reform corporate
culture.2 37 This gives prosecutors and enforcers a stronger evidentiary
basis for the application of Ayres' and Braithwaite's famous enforcement
pyramid.238 Consequently, the entire process becomes more transparent
and credible, which can potentially have positive effects throughout the
industry or relevant community by granting a sense of legitimacy and fair-
ness to the entire enforcement process.
239
2. Reform Undertakings: How
There are certain fundamental attributes that are necessary to ensure
that reform undertakings serve as a powerful tool for effecting meaningful
change in corporate cultures. First, the reform undertaking must be trans-
parent in its processes and explicit in its reason-giving. Transparency fos-
ters credibility and trust, which are fundamental to the sort of iterative and
AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE 49-64 (2000). Some of the key priorities underlying the
new governance regulation, such as pragmatism, flexibility, incrementalism, and learn-
ing by doing, should be familiar to them. Prosecutors and regulators work in flexible,
temporary, case-specific teams. They work from the specific to the general, not the other
way around. The nature of the concrete problem facing them requires that they take an
outcome-oriented and pragmatic, rather than a philosophical or ideological, approach.
Prosecutors and enforcers also have become accustomed to decentralization and delega-
tion of some aspects of their operations, such as information gathering and more
recently, implementation of compliance processes, to the corporations under
investigation.
233. See Ford, supra note 24, at 798-99.
234. See id. at 799.
235. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1015, 1020 n.13 (2004) (adopting Roberto M.
Unger's concept of destabilization to the public law litigation context).
236. Ford, supra note 24, at 805.
237. Id. at 802.
238. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
239. See generally TYLER, supra note 110 (observing that people are more likely to
abide by laws they consider rational and fairly applied).
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investigative exercise contemplated here.240 Second, the Third Party must
employ a forward-looking, problem-solving methodology rather than a ret-
rospective, blame-allocating one. 2 4 1 This entails constructively identifying
and responding to problems, and precludes whitewashing efforts by the
corporation. 24 2 Although the process should be remedial instead of puni-
tive, a credible enforcement capacity should be held in reserve should the
reform undertaking fall apart, as is the case with current deferred prosecu-
tion agreements. 24 3 Indeed, whether considering the regulatory environ-
ment (where purely punitive measures are impermissible) or the
prosecutorial one (where purely punitive measures are almost assumed),
forward-looking remedial mechanisms are better suited to dealing with cor-
porate actors.
244
Third, the reform undertaking process should be flexible. To be suc-
cessful, reform undertakings must be capable of engaging in the experi-
mentation necessary to determine what works, learn from past experience,
240. See Ford, supra note 24. The kind of transparency that matters here is trans-
parency toward the participants in the reform undertaking process. Whether docu-
ments like the Third Party's reports should be made available to others, including
members of the public, is a more difficult question. This kind of openness fosters
accountability but also imposes a potentially crippling chill on parties' willingness to
communicate freely. Existing reform undertakings make no provision for public dis-
semination of third-party reports. One of the authors of this article's requests for such
documents under the Freedom of Information Act thus far have been declined, generally
on the basis that the disclosure of documents could reasonably be expected to interfere
with law enforcement activities. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2000).
241. In other words, the Third Party must, in part, serve as a valued member of the
team seeking to solve the problem at hand and achieve a common goal, as opposed to an
external agent seeking to discover who is at fault. See Kathleen M. Eisenhardt et al., How
Management Teams Can Have a Good Fight, HARv. Bus. REV., July/Aug. 1997, at 77,
80-81 (stressing the importance of a common goal to preventing discussions from dete-
riorating into unproductive arguments over blame); see also David A. Garvin & Michael
A. Roberto, What You Don't Know About Making Decisions, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept. 2001,
at 108, 110-11 (contrasting an advocacy approach, which focuses on persuading and
blaming, with an inquiry approach, which focuses on problem solving and constructive
criticism).
242. See Ford, supra note 24, at 806.
243. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Baker Hughes, supra note 82, at 20-22
(stating that if Baker Hughes violates any terms of the agreement, as determined at the
"sole discretion" of the DOJ, then it may be subject to prosecution, which "may be pre-
mised on information provided by Baker Hughes").
244. For example, many argue that attributing criminal liability to corporations is
incoherent. See, e.g., V. S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It
Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1477 (1996). A classic statement of this position is: "Did you
ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned and no
body to be kicked?" John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick:" An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386
(1981) (quoting Edward, the first Baron Thurlow, from the eighteenth century). Moreo-
ver, criminal enterprises aside, corporations provide important public benefits, includ-
ing shareholder and economic value, employment, and goods and services, meaning
that there is good reason to attempt to reform rather than vindictively hobble them. This
concern is reflected in the McNulty memoandum's direction to prosecutors to consider
the "collateral consequences" to society when deciding whether or not to prosecute a
corporation. See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, supra note 88, at 4.
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and be updated based on new information. 24 5 These capabilities are nec-
essary to ensure the development of remedial measures tailored to each
corporation's unique history and current situation. 246 Organizational cul-
tures are complex and the relevant factors, such as leadership, reward sys-
tems, communication norms, and employee perceptions of justice,
combine in different ways in different corporations but the end result may
be same: a culture that accepts the payment of bribes by employees and
agents. 24 7 Thus, flexibility is necessary to ensure that a reform undertak-
ing is appropriately sensitive to the challenge at hand and has the capacity
to evolve as the actors gain new knowledge of the root causes of the corpo-
ration's problems.
Fourth, the reform undertaking should seek to grow endogenous con-
nections between its own processes and the corporation's unique profile.
This fourth attribute is closely related to the third and goes to the ultimate
goal of this regulatory approach. Because the problem of corruption within
these worst actor firms is embedded in their culture, reform undertakings
must seek to leverage a corporation's resources, capabilities, strategic ori-
entation, and values in the service of effecting thoroughgoing reform. 24 8
Among other things, this means avoiding unreflective mimicry of what may
have worked for other corporations that engaged in similar conduct.
24 9
Consistent with integrity-based compliance programs, 250 the reform
undertaking must encourage a corporation to internally develop its values
and then support those values with the appropriate structures and
systems.
25 1
In principle, none of the above attributes seem beyond the capacity of
any existing reform undertaking, but empirical verification still remains to
be done. However, three additional factors seem equally essential and
anecdotal evidence suggests greater difficulty in incorporating these attrib-
utes into reform undertakings. First, there should be broad and well-man-
aged participation by all levels of the organization in the process. 2 52 It is
difficult to overstate the importance of such participation when the goal is
to effect change to existing culture by questioning current practices 25 3 and
the internal development of organizational values that support ethics over
the continuation of corruption.25 4 This importance becomes clear when
245. See Ford, supra note 24, at 809.
246. See id. at 798-99.
247. See supra Part I.D.2
248. See Ford, supra note 24, at 799.
249. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. R. 147
(1983).
250. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
251. Paine, supra note 201, at 112.
252. See Ford, supra note 24, at 807-09.
253. See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text (discussing Brief and colleagues'
arguments in support of "functional disobedience" to reverse corrupt corporate
cultures).
254. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
integrity-based compliance programs).
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considering such cases as Schnitzer Steel 25 5 and Baker Hughes, 256 where
employees at various levels of the corporate hierarchy and in various geo-
graphic locations apparently participated in longstanding and widespread
wrongdoing.2 57 Without the participation of employees representing these
different positions, the organization is more likely to misperceive the true
causes of the breakdown in the organization's software. In brief, changing
corporate culture requires a combination of top-down, demonstration of
leadership's commitment to ethics, and bottom-up, direct employee partici-
pation in self-governance. Top management, with its skewed view of the
ethical climate of the firm and how employees perceive their ethical leader-
ship,25 8 cannot meaningfully change corporate culture without this
participation.
Although there is evidence that the drafters of some settlement agree-
ments recognize the importance of broad participation, 2 59 in other cases,
this factor may pose significant challenges to allowing reform undertakings
to achieve their full potential. 260 This includes incorporating meaningful
participation from not just lower-level employees but also top manage-
ment.2 6 1 For a number of Third Party monitorships in securities law
enforcement, these problems result from an expert-centric approach to the
role of the monitor.2 62 Although these types of monitors can bring valua-
ble expertise to the process, an approach centered on top-down recommen-
dations for structural change from the Third Party cannot be a substitute
for a corporation's own problem-solving process. 2 63 The endogenous
changes necessary to create a sustainable ethical culture must include the
corporation's direct and meaningful involvement.
26 4
Even if the Third Party takes on the more appropriate role of a consult-
ant or team member, the selection of the monitor will play a significant role
255. See supra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 225-31 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 218-31 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (citing empirical evidence from the
Ethics Resource Center and Trevifno).
259. For example, the Schnitzer Steel Settlement Order stipulates that "Schnitzer shall
require the Compliance Consultant to formulate conclusions based on sufficient evi-
dence obtained through, among other things.., meetings with and interviews of Schnit-
zer employees, officers, directors and any other relevant persons." In re Schnitzer Steel
Industries Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 54,606, at 7 (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http:/
/www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54606.pdf.
260. See Ford, supra note 24, at 808-09.
261. Id. at 809.
262. For examples of such approaches, consider the Breeden reports in the
WorldCom and Hollinger cases. See RICHARD C. BREEDEN, CORPORATE MONITOR, RESTOR-
ING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEw YORK ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF
MCI 25 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/worldcom/wcomreport0803.
pdf; GORDON A. PARIS ET AL., HOLLINGER INT'L INC., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPE-
CIAL COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF HOLLINGER INTERNATIONAL INC. (2004),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/868512/000095012304010413/
y01437exv99w2.htm; see also Ford, supra note 24, at 807-09.
263. See Ford, supra note 24, at 808.
264. See id.
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in the ultimate success of the reform undertaking. For the DOJ's recent
DPAs, monitors are generally legally trained and behave much like lawyers,
collecting documents and assembling a case of sorts. 26 5 This raises the
question of whether the role performed by these Third Parties will lead to a
sufficiently open-ended and participatory dialogic process. 2 66 Meeting the
necessary participation requirements is challenging, and they are costly to
create and maintain relative to more centralized exercises in information
analysis. 26 7 Such a process cannot be expected to spring forth organically
from the reform undertaking without direct attention to the matter on the
part of those drafting the reform undertaking's terms and those imple-
menting them.
268
The selection of the Third Party, then, is crucial, not only because the
Third Party's background and expertise affects his or her approach to the
project but also because the Third Party's role requires him or her to have a
formidable range of skills and qualifications to function effectively. As an
external change agent, a monitor should audit corporate efforts to imple-
ment or improve compliance programs and internal controls, as well as
work to ensure their effectiveness through changes in an organization's
software.26 9 To do this, monitors need to understand the various organiza-
tional hurdles related to the flow of information (especially bad news) in
the firm, the functioning of the incentive system in practice, the social
norms of the organization, and other factors related to the firm's culture
and ethical climate.2 70 In addition, to be successful and sustainable, the
changes a Third Party proposes must be consistent with the strategic needs
of the corporation.
2 71
To accomplish these goals, corporate monitors should have several
necessary characteristics. First, a Third Party must have an appropriate
skill set, including the ability to facilitate dialogue and manage a collective
deliberative process with an appreciation for relevant power imbalances
within the corporation. 2 72 Second, the Third Party must have credibility
both with the corporation and with prosecutors and regulators.2 73 This
likely requires experience in the industry (or in analogous business set-
265. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 17, at 1725 (describing how monitors
carry out their role).
266. Id. Khanna and Dickinson also note that third parties and their subject corpora-
tions frequently disagree about the scope and purview of the monitor's task. Id. This
issue is called "scope creep." Id. This suggests, predictably, that subject corporations
are preoccupied with circumscribing the process and minimizing the destabilization it
represents, but third parties are, perhaps for any number of reasons ranging from ensur-
ing efficacy of the process to paternalistic power-seeking, interested in expanding its
ambit. See id.
267. See id. at 1727.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 1720-26.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id. at 1726.
273. See id. at 1730-31.
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tings) and a reputation for fair dealing. 274 Furthermore, the Third Party
must be both structurally and psychologically independent from the corpo-
ration.27 5 The monitor should have no prospect of future business with
the firm 2 76 and should have his or her own reputational capital at
stake.2 77 Independence also requires that the Third Party be able to access
outside support from prosecutors or regulators in the event of material
non-compliance by the corporation. Third, the Third Party must be
accountable for his or her own conduct and recommendations for the cor-
poration to the SEC, the Department of Justice, or the court.2 78 Collec-
tively, these characteristics allow the Third Party to develop the trust
necessary to make the reform undertaking a meaningful process. Whether
or not actual Third Parties conform to this profile remains to be seen, but
reform undertakings, as products of the legal system, must not simply
default to the selection of Third Parties that are more likely to possess legal
skills than the broader problem-solving and facilitative skills that are
necessary.
The selection of appropriate Third Parties may not be as daunting as it
initially appears. Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there has
been significant growth in attempts to understand the appropriate role and
qualifications of ethics and compliance officers 2 79 and even to profession-
alize their roles. 28 0 These developments should continue to be valuable for
understanding the appropriate skills of Third Parties, identifying potential
candidates to serve as Third Parties, and providing resources and exper-
iences for understanding how to perform the role.
28 1
In addition, Susan Sturm's recent empirical work on ending discrimi-
nation within organizations provides significant insights. 28 2 As stated ear-
lier, Sturm is concerned with "second generation" discrimination, which is
discrimination embedded in an organization's structures and culture.
283
274. Ford, supra note 24, at 811.
275. Id.
276. Id. Most settlement orders underlying modern reform undertakings set out a
period of time after the reform undertaking is concluded, during which the third-party
monitor may not accept any other business from the corporation. Id. at 811 n.179.
277. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,"
57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1406 (2002) (using the term "reputational capital").
278. Ford, supra note 24, at 813-14.
279. For organizations devoted to compliance and ethics professionals, see the Soci-
ety of Corporate Compliance and Ethics website at www.corporatecompliance.org, and
the Open Compliance and Ethics Group website at http://www.oceg.org. For a recent
discussion of the appropriate role of an ethics officer, see CHIEF ETHICS & COMPLIANCE
OFFICER (CECO) DEFINITION WORKING GROUP, ETHICS RESOURCE CTR., LEADING CORPO-
RATE INTEGRITY: DEFINING THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE OFFICER
(CECO) (2007), available at http://www.darden.edu/corporate-ethics/pdf/Leading_
Corporate-Integrity-Report.pdf.
280. See generally SOCIETY OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS, CCEP CANDIDATE
HANDBOOK (2007).
281. See id.
282. See generally Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace
Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARv. J. L. & GENDER 247 (2006) [hereinafter Sturm, The
Architecture of Inclusion].
283. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
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Thus, Sturm's analysis is directly instructive to understanding how Third
Parties can and should function in the reform undertaking context. In her
study of anti-discrimination efforts at higher educational institutions,
Sturm focuses, in part, on the role of key Third Parties, which she calls
"organizational catalysts. '284 Sturm describes organizational catalysts as
"individuals who operate at the convergence of different domains and
levels of activity"285 and who consequently "leverage knowledge, ongoing
strategic relationships, and accountability across systems." 286 As with the
potential for Third Parties retained in reform undertakings, Sturm's organi-
zational catalysts are effective in part because they have knowledge, influ-
ence, and credibility across domains. 28 7 Their skill sets allow them to
serve as "information entrepreneurs" 28 8 by drawing together information
from various sources to assist the corporation in improving its culture.2 89
They act as gadflies, keeping pressure on the organization to focus on the
task at hand, and grant legitimacy and voice to those within the organiza-
tion that seek positive change. 290 In addition, these organizational cata-
lysts cultivate new collaborative relationships among employees at all levels
of the firm, as well as potentially with important outside entities. 29 ' This
connects employees with mutual interests and complementary roles in
reducing corruption that would not have otherwise met and cultivates the
necessary open communication norms that allow employees to find sup-
port for their ethical beliefs.2 92 This is consistent with the observations of
several scholars, in different contexts, that the ability to foster dialogue and
identify shared interests across seemingly impermeable group boundaries
is an especially important trait of the dialogic, pragmatic nature of new
governance problem-solving.
29 3
The third outstanding attribute of a truly effective reform undertak-
ing-in addition to broad participation and a qualified Third Party-exists
at the macro level. This is the need for some form of centralized data col-
lection, aggregation, and analysis. 29 4 Information capture is a major
advantage of reform undertakings relative to other prosecutorial and
enforcement tools. Each undertaking captures a specific case study of
what went wrong in a particular corporation and what steps seem to work
284. Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 282, at 250-5 1.
285. See id. at 250.
286. Id. at 287.
287. See id. at 290.
288. See id.
289. Id. at 290-95.
290. Id. at 297-99.
291. Id. at 295-97.
292. See supra notes 192-198 and accompanying text (discussing mechanisms neces-
sary to support "functional disobedience").
293. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protec-
tion, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 261, 323-27 (2004) (noting that in order to avoid
majoritarian rule, experimentalist equal protection seeks to build common interests
through participation by affected parties); Sabel & Simon, supra note 235, at 1097-100
(discussing the need in public law litigation for affected interests to participate and
communicate).
294. See Ford, supra note 24, at 814.
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(and not work) in breaking through and reversing the stubborn problems
of organizational culture.2 95 This invaluable information for all stakehold-
ers in reform undertakings, including regulators, prosecutors, compliance
professionals, corporations, scholars, and interested members of the gen-
eral public, strengthens the credibility of the reform undertaking project as
a whole.296 Centralized data collection and analysis provides an opportu-
nity to determine the generalizability of lessons from each corporation's
experience.
2 97
Third Party monitors, then, should have the responsibility to collect
the information generated from each reform undertaking in a form that
makes it possible to compare experiences across firms. 298 Centralized
coordination of discrete problem-solving exercises is a core component of
the new governance approach. 299 The SEC is positioned to have systems in
place that can accommodate this informational task,3 0 0 and the DOJ
should be encouraged to do likewise. Other interested parties, such as
industry associations, also may play a role in aggregating and analyzing
information arising out of reform undertakings. 30  Regardless, effective
use of the information requires prosecutors and enforcement staffers to
utilize greater data management skills than they have traditionally been
required to use. In particular, those working with the data will only be
truly effective if they operate as flexibly as the reform undertaking partici-
pants themselves, taking a nuanced and evolving view of the best practices
that emerge from various undertakings as opposed to relying solely on
295. See id. at 815.
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. Currently, Third Party monitor's reports under deferred prosecution agreements
are not required to be made public. Garrett, supra note 18, at 897; see supra note 240
(noting the lack of public access to Third Parties' reports).
299. On the consensus among new governance scholars regarding the need for a
clearinghouse, see Ford, supra note 24, at 814-15 n.187.
300. Consider, for example, the SEC's Office of Risk Assessment (ORA). The ORA
"was formed in 2004 to help the SEC anticipate, identify, and manage risks," but infor-
mation about the ORA on the SEC website is still sparse. U.S. Securities & Exchange
Commission, Office of Risk Assessment (Sept. 13, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/about/
offices/ora.htm.
301. In addition to industry associations, other organizations, such as trade councils,
public watchdogs like Transparency International, or nonprofit organizations focused
on compliance and ethics programs, see supra note 279, may become involved. In
Sturm's model, some combination of these groups and regulators could function collec-
tively as "institutional intermediaries," which she defines as those "public or quasi-pub-
lic organizations that leverage their position within preexisting communities of practice
to foster change and provide meaningful accountability." Sturm, The Architecture of
Inclusion, supra note 282, at 251. Institutional intermediaries perform such functions as
pooling knowledge, structuring collaborative relationships among various interested
entities, developing accountability processes for the knowledge created, and supporting
a community of scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to sustain the process of
knowledge creation. Id. at 251, 280, 312-23. Although Sturm focused on one institu-
tional intermediary performing all of these functions, multiple organizations working
collaboratively could serve the same purpose.
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static checklists or established practices.3 ° 2
B. Institutionalizing Reform
For reform undertakings to produce sustainable change on a wide-
spread basis, the learning processes they stimulate and the reforms they
catalyze must be institutionalized.30 3 Even a reform undertaking's multi-
year destabilization exercise will not overcome self-serving organizational
stasis if it fails to change the ground rules by which the organization oper-
ates. This kind of institutionalization requires action by several different
parties.
Prosecutors and regulators must be prepared to engage in their own
ongoing education about, for example, best compliance practices so that
they are credible in their interactions with corporations. Just as important,
prosecutors and enforcers must maintain a credible enforcement "stick" at
the ready, and they must be prepared to respond quickly and effectively to
wrongdoing, including stonewalling in the course of a reform undertaking.
Such a hard-line approach reinforces the understanding that the status quo
is not an option. Reform undertakings should not be viewed as an all-
purpose alternative to other available sanctions against corporations. In
addition, new governance strategies such as reform undertakings do not
have to, and should not, operate as a mutually exclusive alternative to tradi-
tional enforcement mechanisms. 30 4 Rather, regulators and prosecutors
should have at their disposal the full range of possible sanctions. Reform
undertakings do not function primarily in terms of a deterrent capacity
30 5
but instead seek to address problems to which deterrence alone can pro-
vide only a partial and unpredictable response. 30 6 Overall, reform under-
takings should be viewed as embedded within the more traditional
302. Other interested organizations, see supra note 301, also may play a role in articu-
lating the "best practices" to emerge from reform undertakings. On the relationship
between Third Parties, such as industry associations, trade councils, and regulators,
with respect to reconciling a "best practices" approach within a "light touch" securities
regulatory regime, see Cristie Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based
Securities Regulation, 45 Am. Bus. LJ. 1 (2008).
303. See Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 282, at 299-301.
304. Karkkainen, supra note 19, at 486-89 (clearing up any misconception that new
governance means "soft law" and reiterating the importance of enforceability). There
are very few actual instances in which a reform-undertaking-style monitor was
appointed without the simultaneous imposition of fines, civil penalties, or a restitution
order on a corporation. The rare exceptions in the criminal context appear to be Aurora
Foods, Inc. in 2001 and Merrill Lynch in 2003. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 17,
at 1745, 1750. In practice, clearly, reform undertakings co-exist with other sanctions.
This is not to suggest that most, or even any, reform undertaking settlement agreements
reflect the idealized or "true" reform undertaking model. However, even the "true"
reform undertaking should be able to operate effectively in tandem with fines, restitu-
tion orders, individual penalties, and other sanctions.
305. But see Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 17, at 1727-31 (describing corporate
monitors as a deterrence mechanism and comparing their use to cash penalties).
306. See supra Part I.B; see also Ford, supra note 24, at 769-72 (discussing the limits
of deterrence-based approaches in addressing corporate cultural problems).
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enforcement and prosecutorial functions.3 0 7
The continual, active maintenance of the ethical culture must also be
institutionalized within the corporation. The establishment of the neces-
sary organizational hardware is not sufficient.308 The software of the cor-
poration-which it should be noted is significantly less auditable for
monitoring by external agents than a corporation's hardware-must be
actively managed and updated to handle the new risks that the corporation
faces as it enters new markets, adjusts its strategies to remain competitive,
and generally adapts to the changing business environment. 30 9 For exam-
ple, top management must ensure that employees appropriately perceive its
demonstrations of ethical leadership and understand that norms of open
communication on ethical issues are not eviscerated by the demands of
short-term profitability. 3 10 In short, "functional disobedience" must be
allowed to flourish and new employees must be socialized into positive
organizational values and not into routinized corruption.
To create an environment in which the corporation no longer needs
the reform undertaking to further its own compliance progress and solve
its organizational culture problems requires a broader reorientation. To
this end, Third Parties and all participants in the reform undertaking pro-
cess should remain alert to new strategic alliances that emerge from its
dialogic process. Third Parties also should take steps to entrench and
encourage these alliances where they further law-abiding or "watchdog"
behavior. Working in concert increases each party's capacity to effect
change. 3 1 1 The multiple stakeholder groups that determine the content of
the corporation's broader "license to operate
'3 12 also play a key role. 3 13
No prosecutorial or enforcement action can achieve meaningful reform on
its own if it operates in isolation from, or in opposition to, the larger law-
favoring forces at work on the corporation. 3 14 The reform undertaking is
307. The continuing specter of sanctions means that there will be costs at the mar-
gins. That is, the reform undertaking process may not be characterized by dialogue as
free as that which would take place without any coercive "stick" in the background.
Although trust is important to dialogue, reform undertakings do not require a level of
mutual trust and open-ended dialogue between a corporation and a Third Party, which
is impossible in the enforcement/prosecutorial context. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Governance
and American Political Development, in LAW AND NEw GOVERNANCE IN THE E.U. AND THE
U.S. 381 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006). On the contrary, reform under-
takings open up a space that would not otherwise exist within the enforcement super-
structure. It is within this space that there is the best chance of having the type of
dialogue necessary to sufficiently address corporate culture problems.
308. See supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
309. See Hess, supra note 113, at 1811.
310. See supra notes 192-204 and accompanying text.
311. See Hess, supra note 113, at 1812-14 (discussing the potential role of intermedi-
ary groups in improving the use of integrity-based compliance and ethics programs).
312. Gunningham et al., supra note 30, at 329.
313. See id. at 329-39.
314. For example, in examining when financial executives would actually use their
companies' code of ethics in strategic decision-making, Stevens and colleagues found
that regulatory pressure was insignificant. John M. Stevens et al., Symbolic or Substantive
Document? The Influence of Ethics Codes on Financial Executives' Decisions, 26 STRAT.
MGMT. J. 181, 183-84, 188 (2004). Instead, significant factors included market pres-
Cornell International Law Journal
an important prosecutorial and enforcement tool not only for its processes
during its active term but especially for the ongoing reformative process
that it has the potential to catalyze in the future.
Conclusion
Over the past decade the problem of corruption has finally started
receiving the attention that it deserves from policymakers. 3 15 Over the
past few years, the Securities and Exchange Commission and Department
of Justice have finally started making serious efforts to enforce the United
States' anti-bribery laws against corporations. 3 16 These efforts will not be
effective against the worst offenders, however, if they do not address the
issue of corporate ethical culture. Over time, the use of improper payments
can become embedded in a corporation's culture and its day-to-day rou-
tines. The organizational actors treat the payment of bribes or the use of
agents that the company suspects of paying bribes solely as economic
issues, not as legal and ethical issues. Through the DOJ's use of deferred
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements and the SEC's use of settle-
ment agreements, these agencies are attempting to address these root
causes of corruption in many corporations. These agreements typically
require corporations to adopt more effective compliance programs and to
retain independent corporate monitors to oversee the implementation
process.
This article analyzed the potential effectiveness of these agreements
through a new governance perspective and developed the idea of a reform
undertaking. Based on the essential features for effectiveness that this arti-
cle identified, reform undertakings have much in common with current
deferred prosecution agreements and SEC settlements, but there are also
significant differences. Of primary importance is the role of the Third-
Party independent monitor. This Third Party should serve not as a simple
monitor or as an all-powerful czar 3 17 but must take on facilitating and
problem-solving roles. These are roles that require significantly different
sets of skills and characteristics than someone serving a monitoring role or
a czar role. Overall, through the use of a new governance perspective, this
article identified essential features of reform undertakings that can more
effectively tackle the root cause of persistent corrupt behavior by corpora-
tions-the corporation's ethical culture-than alternative regulatory
mechanisms.
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315. Hess & Dunfee, Fighting Corruption, supra note 29, at 600 (quoting the president
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ago, the word corruption was never mentioned. Today, there is a publicly expressed
revulsion, on moral, on social, and on economic grounds.").
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